Виктор Суворов. Советская Армия: взгляд изнутри (engl)
страница №9
... they used them nevertheless, capturing more ammunition as theyfought. What is the secret of the Kalashnikov? It is uncomplicated and
reliable, like a comrade-in-arms, and these are the two qualities of
greatest importance in a battle.
2
My museum will have weapons from everywhere--from Germany and Britain,
France and Japan. But the greatest number will come from the Soviet Union. I
hate the Communists, but I love Soviet weapons. The fact is that Soviet
designers realised, decades ago, the simple truth that only uncomplicated
and reliable equipment can be successful in war. This is as true as the fact
that the only plans which will succeed are those which are simple and easily
understood and that the best battledress is the simplest and most hard
wearing.
Soviet requirements from a weapon are that it must be easy to produce
and simple in construction, which makes it easier to teach soldiers to use
it and simpler to maintain and repair.
Although the Soviet Union produced the same amount of steel as Germany,
it built a much greater number of tanks. Moreover, because of the simplicity
of their construction, it proved possible to repair tens of thousands of
these tanks and to return them to battle two or even three times.
General Guderian admired Soviet tanks and wrote about them,
enthusiastically and at length. He was insistent in urging that Germany
should copy the T-34. The design of this Soviet tank was taken as a basis
for the `Panzer' and shortly afterwards for the `Tiger-König'. But the
German designers were unable to meet the most important
requirement--simplicity of construction. As a result only 4,815 Panzer tanks
were built in all, while no more than 484 `Tiger-König' tanks were ever
produced. In the same period the Soviet Union built 102,000 tanks, 70,000 of
which were T-34s.
In considering these figures it should be remembered that, while most
German tank factories were subjected to bombing, many Soviet factories were
lost altogether--the Kharkov plant was captured by the Germans in the first
months of the war, and this was the largest Soviet factory and the
birthplace of the T-34; the Stalingrad tank factory was the setting for the
fiercest fighting it is possible to imagine. Leningrad was besieged, but,
despite being without steel or coal, the tank factory there, which was
subjected to constant artillery bombardment, continued to repair tanks for
three years. On some occasions tanks which still were under repair had to be
used to fire through gaps in the walls at advancing groups of German
soldiers. The only factory that was left was in the Urals and it was to this
that the machinery was taken and set up, virtually in the open air, to
produce the world's simplest and most reliable tank.
It should not be thought that Soviet equipment suffers any harmful
effects because of its simplicity of design. Quite the reverse. In its time,
the T-34 was not only the simplest but also the most powerful tank in the
world.
3
When a MIG-25 landed in Japan, the Western experts who examined it
marvelled at the simplicity of its design. Naturally, for propaganda
purposes, the fighting qualities of this excellent aircraft were disparaged.
One not particularly perceptive specialist even commented, `We had thought
it was made of titanium but it turns out to be nothing but steel.' It is, in
fact, impossible to reach the speeds of which the MIG-25 is capable using
titanium: yet the Soviet designers had managed to build this, the fastest
combat aircraft in the world, from ordinary steel.
This is a most significant fact. It means that this remarkable aircraft
can be built without especially complicated machine tools or the help of
highly skilled specialists, and that its mass-production in wartime would be
unaffected by shortages of important materials. Furthermore, this aircraft
is exceedingly cheap to produce and could therefore be built in very great
numbers if this were necessary. This is its most important characteristic;
the fact that for two decades it has been the fastest interceptor aircraft
in the world, with the highest rate of climb, is of secondary significance.
4
Technology is developing and each year equipment becomes more and more
complex. But this does not conflict with the overall philosophy of Soviet
designers. Of course, decades ago, their predecessors used the latest
equipment available in their combat vehicles and aircraft and this equipment
must then have been considered very complex. But the iron, unbreakable
principle observed by Soviet designers retains its force. Whenever a new
piece of equipment is being developed, making the use of highly complex
tools and techniques unavoidable, there is always a choice of hundreds, even
thousands of possible technical procedures. The designers will always select
the very simplest possible of all the choices open to them. It would, of
course, be feasible to produce an automatic transmission system for a jeep,
but it is possible to get by with an ordinary one. This being so, there can
be only one Soviet choice--the ordinary transmission.
I once saw a film comparing a Soviet and an American tank. A driver was
given both models to drive and he was then asked--`Which is the better?' The
American one, of course,' said the driver. `It has automatic transmission,
whereas in the Soviet tank you have to change gear, which is not easy in a
heavy machine.' He was quite right--if you see war as a pleasant outing. But
Soviet designers realise that any future war will be anything but this. They
consider, quite correctly, that, if there are mass bombing attacks, if whole
industrial areas are destroyed, if long-distance communications break down,
mass production of tanks with automatic transmission would be out of the
question. Equally it would be impossible to repair or service tanks of this
sort which had been produced before the war. Accordingly, there can be only
one choice--the ordinary, non-automatic transmission. This may be hard on
the tank driver--he will get tired. But it will be easier for industry and
for the whole country, which will continue to produce tanks by the ten
thousand on machines which have been set up virtually in the open air.
5
The simplicity of Soviet weapons surprises everyone. But each type of
equipment which is produced is turned out in two variants--the normal one
and the `monkey-model'.
The `monkey-model' is a weapon which has been simplified in every
conceivable way and which is intended for production in wartime only.
For instance, the T-62 tank is one of the simplest fighting vehicles in
the world. But as it was being designed, a still simpler version was also
being developed, for wartime use. The `monkey-model' of the T-62 does not
have a stabilised gun, carries simplified radio and optical equipment, the
night-vision equipment uses an infra-red light source to illuminate targets
(a method which is twenty years old), the gun is raised and turned manually,
steel rather than wolfram or uranium is used for the armour-plating piercing
caps of its shells.
Soviet generals consider, justifiably, that it is better to have tanks
like these in a war than none at all. It is intended that the `monkey-model'
approach will be used not only for building tanks, but for all other sorts
of equipment--rockets, guns, aircraft, radio sets, etc. In peacetime these
variants are turned out in large quantities, but they are only issued to
countries friendly to the Soviet Union. I have seen two variants of the
BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle--one which is issued to the Soviet army and
another which is intended for the Soviet Union's Arab friends. I counted
sixty-three simplifications which made the second `monkey-model' different
from the original version. Among the most important of these were: The 73mm
gun has no loading or round selection equipment. Whereas in the Soviet
version the gunnerjust presses the appropriate buttons and the round which
he requires slides into the barrel, in the simplified model all of this has
to be done by hand, and furthermore, the gun is not stabilised. The turret
is rotated and the gun is raised mechanically. In the Soviet version this is
done electrically--the mechanical system is there only as a back-up. The
`export' version is armed with the Malyutka rocket, the Soviet one with the
`Malyutka-M', which differs from the other model in having an automatic
target guidance system. The `monkey-model' is without the lead internal
lining on the walls, which protects the crew against penetrating radiation
and against flying fragments of armour in the event of a direct hit. The
optical system is greatly simplified, as is the communications equipment,
there is no automatic radiation or gas detector, there is neither an
automatic hermetic sealing system nor an air filtration system, for use in
conditions of very heavy contamination, no automatic topographical fixation
system is fitted and many other systems are missing.
When one of these `monkey-models' fell into the hands of Western
specialists, they naturally gained a completely false impression of the true
combat capabilities of the BMP-1 and of Soviet tanks. For what they were
looking at was no more than a casing, or a container, like an empty money
box which is of no value without its contents.
The Soviet Union is currently making deliveries abroad of T-72 tanks,
MIG-23 fighters and TU-22 bombers. But these are different from the models
with which the Soviet Army has armed itself. When one of a man's pockets
contains banknotes and the other simply holds pieces of paper, it is quite
impossible to tell which is which from the outside.
The current Soviet policy concerning equipment is a wise one--to amass
first-class but very simple equipment in quantities sufficient for the first
few weeks of a war. If the war continues, equipment will be produced on an
enormous scale, but in variants which have been simplified to the greatest
possible extent. Experience of producing both standard and `monkey' models
is being gained in peacetime; the simpler variants are being sold to the
`brothers' and `friends' of the USSR as the very latest equipment available.
Learning from Mistakes
1
The winter of 1969 was an exceptionally bitter one in the Soviet Far
East. When the first clashes with the Chinese took place on the river
Ussuri, and before combat divisions reached the area, the pressure exerted
by the enemy was borne by the KGB frontier troops. After the clash was over,
the General Staff held a careful investigation into all the mistakes and
oversights which had occurred. It was quickly discovered that several KGB
soldiers had frozen to death in the snow, simply because they had never
received elementary instruction in sleeping out in temperatures below zero.
This was alarming news. A commission from the General Staff immediately
carried out experiments with three divisions, chosen at random, and came to
a depressing conclusion. Wartime experience had been irrevocably lost and
the modern Soviet soldier had not been taught how he could sleep in the
snow. Naturally he was not allowed a sleeping bag and of course he was
forbidden to light a fire. Normally a soldier would spend nights when the
temperature was below freezing-point in his vehicle. But what was he to do
if the vehicle was put out of action?
The chiefs of staff of all divisions were immediately summoned to
Moscow. They were given a day's instruction in the technique of sleeping out
in snow at freezing temperatures, using only a greatcoat. Then each of them
was required to convince himself that this was possible, by sleeping in the
snow for three nights. (It should be remembered that March in
Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, is a hard month, with snow on the ground and
temperatures below zero.) Then the chiefs of staff returned to their
divisions and immediately the entire Soviet Army was put to a very hard
test--that of spending a night in the open in numbing cold and without any
extra clothing. It seemed as if those who were stationed in deserts in the
south were in luck. But no--they were sent by turns to either Siberia or the
north to be put through the same tough training. Thereafter, spending a
night in the snow became a part of all military training programmes.
Two years before this, following the shameful defeats in Sinai, when it
had become clear how much Arab soldiers fear tanks and napalm, urgent orders
had been issued, making it compulsory for all Soviet soldiers and officers,
up to the rank of general, to jump through roaring flames, and to shelter in
shallow pits as tanks clattered by just above their heads, or, if they could
not find even this protection, to lie on the ground between the tracks of
the roaring vehicles.
The Soviet Army re-learned its lessons within a single day. I have felt
napalm on my own skin, I have crouched in a pit as a tank crashed by
overhead, and I have spent terrible nights in the snow.
At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had no idea how to organise
the defence of the country or, particularly, of the large towns. It had
never been taught how to do this. It had only learned how to attack and how
to `carry the war on to the enemy's territory'. However, the war began in
accordance with the plans of the German General Staff rather than of their
Soviet opponents. One catastrophe followed another. Attempts to defend Minsk
lasted for three days, to hold Kiev for two days. Everyone was at their
wits' end to know how to organise things better. Kiev fell at the end of
September and by October Guderian was approaching Moscow. Suddenly,
something quite astonishing happened. Soviet defences became impenetrable,
specifically those around Moscow, Tula and Tver'. For the first time in the
course of the Second World War, the German military machine was brought to a
standstill. It is said that freezing weather played its part in turning the
tide. This was true enough in November and December, but in October the
weather was sunny. Something had happened; a radical change had occurred.
The next year, the battle for Stalingrad took place--the city was defended
throughout the summer, and frosts played no part in the outcome. This
campaign will go down in history as a model for the defence of a large city.
A second such model is the defence of Leningrad which held out for almost
three years, during which one and a half million of its citizens lost their
lives. It was under attack for two winters and three summers. Freezing
temperatures played no role here either--the city could have been taken
during any season in these three years.
In the Soviet Army the dividing line between inability to perform a
particular role and the capacity to carry it out with great professional
skill is almost indiscernible. Transitions from one to the other occur
almost instantaneously, not only in tactics, strategy and the training of
personnel but also in equipment programmes.
2
At the beginning of the 1960s a discussion developed in the Western
military journals about the need for a new infantry combat vehicle: this
must be amphibious, well armoured, and highly manoeuvrable, and must have
considerable fire-power. The Soviet military press responded only with a
deathly silence. The discussion gathered strength, there was much argument
for and against the proposition, intensive tests were carried out... the
Soviet Union remained silent.
One night towards the end of 1966 heavy transporters arrived at our
military academy carrying unusual vehicles of some sort, which were covered
in tarpaulins. These were BMP-1s--amphibious, fiendishly manoeuvrable,
well-armoured and heavily armed. By 1967 this vehicle was being produced in
great numbers: meanwhile the discussion in the West continued. Only West
Germany took any positive steps, by building the `Marder'--which was an
excellent vehicle, but was not amphibious and carried almost the same
armament as previous German armoured personnel carriers. Sadly, it was also
exceptionally complicated in design.
In the early 1980s, the discussion is still in progress in the West;
the first tentative steps have been taken, but at present, as before, the
United States has armoured personnel carriers which are armed only with
machine-guns. Of course, Western specialists have found many faults in the
construction of the BMP-1. But this is yesterday's product--and the `monkey
model' of it at that. The Soviet Union has been producing a second
generation of BMPs in massive quantities for a long time now while, in the
West, discussion continues.
The same has happened with military helicopters, self-propelled
artillery, automatic mortars and many other types of equipment.
When will we be able to dispense with the tank?
1
One day, in Paris, I bought a book, published in 1927, on the problems
of a future war. The author was sober-minded and reasonable. His logic was
sound, his analysis was shrewd and his arguments unassailable. After
analysing the way military equipment had developed in his lifetime, the
author concluded by declaring that the proper place for the tank was in the
museum, next to the dinosaur skeletons. His argument was simple and logical:
anti-tank guns had been developed to the point at which they would bring
massive formations of tanks to a complete halt in any future war, just as
machine guns had completely stopped the cavalry in the First World War.
I do not know whether the author lived until 1940, to see the German
tanks sweeping along the Paris boulevards, past the spot at which, many
decades later, I was to buy my dusty copy of his book, its leaves yellowing
with age. The belief that the tank is reaching the end of its life is itself
surprisingly long-lived. At the beginning of the 1960s, France decided to
stop production of tanks, because their era was over. It is fortunate that
this delusion was shattered by the Israelis' old `Sherman' tanks in the
Sinai peninsula. Israel's brilliant victory showed the whole world, once
again, that no anti-tank weapon is able to stop tanks in a war, provided, of
course, that they are used skilfully.
The argument used by the tank's detractors is simple--`Just look at the
anti-tank rockets--at their accuracy and at their armour-piercing
capability!' But this argument does not hold water. The anti-tank rocket is
a defensive weapon--part of a passive system. The tank, on the other hand,
is an offensive weapon. Any defensive system involves the dispersal of
forces over a wide territory, leaving them strong in some places and weak in
others. And it is where they are weak that the tanks will appear, in
enormous concentrations. Even if it were possible to distribute resources
equally, this would mean that no one sector would have enough. Try deploying
just ten anti-tank rockets along every kilometre of the front. The tanks
will then choose one particular spot and will attack it in their hundreds,
or perhaps thousands, simultaneously. If you concentrate your anti-tank
resources, the tanks will simply by-pass them. They are an offensive weapon
and they have the initiative in battle, being able to choose when and where
to attack and how strong a force to use.
The hope that the perfection of anti-tank weapons would lead to the
death of the tank has been shown to be completely unfounded. It is like
hoping that the electronic defences of banks will become so perfect in the
future that bank robbers will die out as a breed. I assure you that bank
robbers will not become extinct. They will improve their tools, their
tactics, their information about their targets and their methods of
misleading their enemies and they will continue to carry out raids.
Sometimes these will fail, sometimes they will succeed, but they will
continue so long as banks continue to exist. The robbers have the same
advantage as tanks--they are on the offensive. They decide where, when and
how to attack and will do so only when they are confident of success, when
they have secretly discovered a weak spot in the enemy's defences, whose
existence is unknown even to the enemy himself.
2
Soviet generals have never been faced with problems of this sort. They
have always known that victory in a war can only be achieved by advancing.
To them defensive operations spell defeat and death. In the best case, such
operations can only produce a deadlock, and not for long, at that. Victory
can only be achieved by means of an offensive--by seizing the initiative and
raining blows on the enemy's most vulnerable areas.
Thus, to win, you must attack, you must move forward unexpectedly and
with determination, you must advance. For this you need a vehicle which can
travel anywhere to destroy the enemy, preferably remaining unscathed itself.
The one vehicle which combines movement, fire-power and armour is the tank.
Perhaps, in the future, its armour will be perfected, perhaps it will not
have tracks but will travel in some other way (there have been wheeled
tanks), perhaps it will not have a gun but be armed with something else
(there have been tanks armed solely with rockets), perhaps all sorts of
things will be changed, but its most important characteristics--its ability
to move, to shoot and to defend itself--will remain. As long as there are
wars, as long as the desire for victory lasts, the tank will exist. Nuclear
war has not only not written it off, but has given it a new lease of
life--nothing is so suited to nuclear war as a tank. To survive a nuclear
war you must put your money on these steel boxes.
The Flying Tank
1
Drive a tank on to an airfield and park it near a military aircraft.
Next put a helicopter between the tank and the aircraft. Now, look at each
of them and then answer the question--which does the helicopter resemble
more--the tank or the aircraft?
I know what your opinion will be. You don't need to tell me. But the
Soviet generals believe that to all intents and purposes the helicopter is a
tank. In fact they find it difficult to distinguish between the two.
Certainly there is very little in common between the helicopter and the
aircraft. Small details, like the ability to fly, but nothing more.
Of course, they are right. The helicopter is related to the tank, not
to the aircraft. The reasoning behind this is simple enough--in battle a
tank can seize enemy territory and a helicopter can do the same. But an
aircraft cannot. An aircraft can destroy everything on the surface and deep
below it, but it can not seize and hold territory.
For this reason, the Soviet Army sees the helicopter as a tank--one
which is capable of high speeds and unrestricted cross-country performance,
but is only lightly armoured. It also has approximately the same fire-power
as a tank.
The tactics employed in the use of helicopters and tanks are strikingly
similar. An aircraft is vulnerable because in most cases it can only operate
from an airfield. Both the helicopter and the tank operate in open ground.
An aircraft is vulnerable because it flies above the enemy. A helicopter and
a tank both see the enemy in front of them. To attack, a helicopter does not
need to fly over the enemy or to get close to him.
The introduction of the helicopter was not greeted with any particular
enthusiasm by the Air Forces, but the Land Forces were jubilant--here was a
tank with a rotor instead of tracks, which need not fear minefields or
rivers or mountains.
It is therefore not surprising that the airborne assault brigades
(which are carried by helicopter) form part of the complement of Tank Armies
or of Fronts, which use them for joint operations with Tank Armies.
At the present moment the Soviet MI-24 is the best combat helicopter in
the world. This is not just my personal opinion, but one which is shared by
Western military experts. Knowing the affection which Soviet Marshals have
for their helicopters, I prophesy that even better variants of these flying
tanks will appear in the next few years. Or are they, perhaps, already
flying above Saratov or somewhere, even though we have not been shown them
yet?
The Most Important Weapon
1
Before the Second World War each army had its own approach to questions
of defence. Drawing on their experience of the First World War, the French
considered that their main problem was to survive artillery bombardments,
which might continue for several days or even several months. The German
generals decided that they must make their forces capable of repelling
attacks by all enemy arms of service. The Soviet generals concluded that
they must avoid diluting their resources and that they must concentrate on
the most important of the arms of service. Since for them this was the tank,
they saw defence purely as defence against tanks. Their defence system could
therefore only be considered complete when their forces were asked to
repulse tank attacks. If we can only stop the enemy's tanks, the generals
reasoned, everything else will be halted, too.
They were right, as many German generals, the first of whom was
Guderian, have acknowledged. Many of the battles which took place on Soviet
territory followed a standard scenario. The German forces would launch a
very powerful tank attack, which, from the second half of 1942 onwards the
Soviet troops always succeeded in halting. This was the course of events at
Stalingrad, at Kursk and in Hungary, in the Balaton operations. From 1943
onwards, having exhausted their capacity for launching such attacks, the
German forces were ordered by Hitler to adopt a strategy of defence in
depth. But this was not the way to oppose tanks. This strategy did not
enable the German army to halt a single breakthrough by Soviet tanks.
2
Remembering the war, Soviet generals insist that defence must mean,
first and foremost, defence against tanks. The enemy can gain victories only
by advancing and, in the nuclear age, as before, offensive operations will
be carried out by tanks and infantry. Other forces can not carry out an
offensive: their only role is to support the tanks and the infantry. Thus,
defence is essentially a battle against tanks.
The most important weapon in achieving victory is the tank. The most
important weapon in depriving the enemy of victory is the anti-tank weapon.
The Soviet Union therefore devotes great attention to the development of
anti-tank weapons. As a result, it is frequently the first in the world with
really revolutionary technical and tactical innovations. For example, as
early as 1955, the USSR began production of the `Rapira' smoothbore
anti-tank gun, which has an astonishingly high muzzle velocity. In its
introduction of this weapon it led the West by more than a quarter of a
century. In the same year a start was also made with production of the
APNB-70 infra-red night sight, for the `Rapira'. Sights of this type were
not issued to Western armies for another ten years.
The, Soviet Army takes exceptionally strict measures to safeguard the
secrets of its anti-tank weapons. Many of these are completely unknown in
the West. The Chief Directorate of Strategic Camouflage insists that the
only anti-tank weapons which may be displayed are those which can be
exported--in other words the least effective ones. The systems which may not
be exported are never demonstrated but remain unknown from their birth,
throughout their secret life and often, even, after their death. We will say
something about these later.
3
Because they consider anti-tank warfare to be so important, Soviet
generals insist that every soldier and every weapon system should be capable
of attacking tanks.
Every soldier is therefore armed with a single-shot `Mukha' anti-tank
rocket launcher. These rocket launchers are issued to all motor transport
drivers and to those belonging to staff, rear-support and all other
auxiliary sub-units.
When the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle was being developed, the
designers suggested a 23mm gun as its armament--this would be effective
against infantry, and is simple and easy to load. But the generals opposed
this; as a first priority, the vehicle must be capable of opposing tanks; it
must have anti-tank rockets and a gun which, even though small, could be
used against tanks. The BMP-1 was therefore fitted with a 73mm automatic
gun, capable of destroying any enemy tank at ranges of up to 1,300 metres,
with anti-tank rockets which can be used over greater ranges. The fact that
20mm automatic guns are fitted to Western infantry combat vehicles is met
with friendly incomprehension by Soviet military specialists: `If such a
vehicle is not capable of taking on our tanks, why was it built?'
It is true that a light anti-aircraft gun has recently been mounted on
the BMP. But this does not indicate any alteration in its main function.
This gun is installed as an auxiliary weapon, to supplement the anti-tank
rockets and also as an anti-helicopter weapon. In other words, it is
intended for use against the flying tank. Incidentally, the decision to fit
it was taken only after the designers had been able to demonstrate that it
could also be used against conventional, earthbound tanks.
All other Soviet weapon systems, even if they are not primarily
intended as anti-tank weapons, must also be able to function as such.
Accordingly, all Soviet howitzers are supplied with anti-tank shells and
anti-aircraft guns are much used against tanks--their teams are trained for
this role and are issued with suitable ammunition.
But this is not all. The new AGS19 Plamya rocket-launcher and the
Vasilek automatic mortar can also be used against tanks, as a secondary
function. They each have a rate of fire of 120 rounds a minute and both are
capable of flat trajectory fire against advancing tanks.
Finally, the BM-21, BM-27, Grad-P and other salvo-firing rocket
launchers can fire over open sights and flood oncoming tanks with fire.
Why are Anti-tank Guns not Self-propelled?
1
Why does the Soviet Union not use self-propelled anti-tank guns? This
is a question which many are unable to answer. After all, a self-propelled
gun is far more mobile on the battle-field than one which is towed, and its
crew is better protected. This question has already been partially answered
in the last chapter. The Soviet Union has some excellent self-propelled
anti-tank weapon systems--but it does not put them on display. Nevertheless,
it is true that towed guns are in the majority. Why is this so? There are
several reasons:
Firstly: A towed anti-tank gun is many times easier to manufacture and
to use than one which is self-propelled. In wartime it might be feasible to
reduce the production of tanks; the effect of this would simply be to reduce
the intensity of offensive operations. But a drop in the production of
anti-tank weapons would be catastrophic. Whatever happens, they must be
produced in sufficient quantities. Otherwise any tank breakthrough by the
enemy could prove fatal for the whole military production programme, for the
national economy, and for the Soviet Union itself. In order to ensure that
these guns are turned out, whatever the situation, even in the midst of a
nuclear war, it is essential that they should be as simple in construction
as possible. It was no chance that the first Soviet smoothbore guns to be
produced were anti-tank guns. Smoothbore guns for Soviet tanks were brought
out considerably later. Although a smooth barrel reduces the accuracy of
fire, it enables muzzle velocity to be raised considerably, and, most
important of all, it simplifies the construction of the gun.
Secondly: A towed gun has a very low silhouette, at least half that of
a tank. In single combat with a tank, especially at maximum range, this
offers better protection than armour plate or manoeuvrability.
Thirdly: Anti-tank guns are used in two situations. In defence, when
the enemy has broken through, is advancing fast and must be stopped at any
price. And in an offensive when one's own troops have broken through and are
advancing rapidly, and the enemy tries to cut through the spearhead at its
base, with a flank attack, cutting off the advancing forces from their rear
areas. In both these situations, anti-tank guns must stop the enemy's tanks
at some pre-determined line, which he must not be allowed to cross. Towed
guns are compelled, by the weight of their construction, to fight to the
death. They are unable to manoeuvre or to move to a better position.
Certainly, their losses are always very high. That is why they are
traditionally nicknamed `Farewell, Motherland!' But by stopping the enemy on
the predetermined line, the anti-tank sub-units can save the whole division,
Army and sometimes the whole Front. This is what happened at Kursk. If the
anti-tank guns had been self-propelled, their commander would have been able
to withdraw to a more advantageous position when he came under enemy
pressure. This would have saved his small anti-tank sub-unit, but it might
have brought catastrophe to the division, the Army, the Front and perhaps to
several Fronts.
Lest seditious thoughts should enter the head of the anti-tank
commander, and so that he should not think of pulling back in a critical
situation, his anti-tank guns have no means of propulsion. In battle their
armoured tractors are housed in shelters; they would scarcely be able to
pull the guns away from the battle, under the deadly fire of the enemy. Only
one option is available to the crews--to die on the spot, as they prevent
the enemy from crossing the line which they are holding.
During the war, one of the main reasons for the unyielding stability of
the Soviet formations was the presence among them of huge but virtually
immobile units of anti-tank guns.
The Favourite Weapon
1
The Soviet commander's favourite weapon is the mortar. A mortar is
simply a tube, one end of which rests on a base plate, while the other end
points skywards, supported on two legs. It would be difficult to devise a
simpler weapon, which is why it is such a favourite.
In 1942, a terrible year for the USSR, during which military production
fell to a catastrophically low level, the mortar was the one weapon which
remained available to every commander.
In three and a half years of war, the Soviet Union produced 348,000
mortars. In the same period, Germany produced 68,000. All the remaining
countries put together produced considerably less than Germany. Furthermore,
the Soviet mortars were the most powerful in the world and the number of
bombs produced for each was the highest recorded anywhere.
Soviet commanders value the mortar so highly because of its reliability
and its almost primitive simplicity, because it only takes a few minutes to
teach a soldier how to use it, and because it needs almost no
maintenance--its barrel is not even rifled! And they also like its immediate
readiness, in any situation, to fire quite heavy bombs at the enemy, even
though it lacks complete accuracy.
The pressure generated inside a mortar barrel when it fires is
relatively low and therefore a mortar, unlike a gun or a howitzer, can fire
cast-iron rather than steel bombs. This adds two further
advantages--firstly, simplicity and cheapness of production, secondly the
fact that when a cast iron bomb bursts it shatters into very small
splinters, which form a dense fragment pattern. Steel gun and howitzer
shells are not only more expensive but are more solidly constructed and
therefore produce a smaller quantity of splinters, which do not cover the
area so densely.
In France and the US, after the war, mortars were improved. They had
rifled barrels which gave them greater accuracy. As early as 1944, a Soviet
designer, B. L. Shavyrin, had suggested that Soviet mortars should be
rifled, but he was firmly rebuffed--it was simpler to make ten smoothbore
mortars than one with rifling. Even if a rifled mortar was twice as
effective as a smoothbore one, the latter would therefore still be a far
better proposition, if it was only twice as effective, but cost ten times as
much to produce, it must rate as a very poor weapon. I entirely agree with
this point of view.
But what about accuracy? you will ask. It is of no significance. Soviet
commanders have chosen a different way of approaching the problem. If you
have to pay for accuracy with complexity of design, you are following the
wrong path. Quantity is the better way to exert pressure. Since two simple,
smoothbore mortars can do the work of one rifled one we will use the two
simple ones, which will have the additional advantage of producing a lot
more noise, dust and fire than one. And this is by no means unimportant in
war. The more noise you produce, the higher the morale of your troops and
the lower that of the enemy. What is more, two mortars are harder to destroy
than one.
Yet another approach to the problem was devised. The lack of accuracy
of Soviet mortars is more than made up for by the explosive power of their
bombs. To Soviet commanders, the best mortar is a large one--the bigger it
is the better. At present the largest American mortar is their 106.7mm,
while the smallest Soviet one is 120mm. The biggest American mortar tar bomb
weighs 12.3 kilogrammes, the smallest Soviet one 16 kilogrammes. But besides
this small mortar, the Soviet Army has a 160mm version, which fires a 40
kilogramme bomb and a 240mm version which fires a 100 kilogramme bomb.
Anyone who has seen 120mm mortars firing, especially if he was near
them, will never forget the experience. I have actually seen 12 240mm
mortars in action together. These fire not 16 kilogramme but 100 kilogramme
bombs. Within twenty minutes, each mortar fired 15 bombs. This represented,
as I later calculated, a total of 18 tons of explosives and cast-iron
splinters. I found the noise absolutely staggering. It was amazing that men
could retain their sanity in the midst of it. While the firing was in
progress, one had the impression that thousands of tons of explosive were
going off each second and the whole process seemed to last an age. The
astonishing destructive power of these mortars makes up for any inaccuracy
in aiming or in dispersion. I believe that this is the correct approach.
Only one country, Israel, has had a chance to test the value of this
exceptionally cheap and effective policy. Her army has 160mm mortars. I
sincerely hope that she will progress further--she is on the right path.
2
The outstanding simplicity, reliability and ease of maintenance of the
240mm mortar are vital qualities, and they played a decisive role when the
moment came to decide which should be the first artillery weapon to fire
nuclear projectiles. It was the obvious choice and it is now many years
since it was selected for this role. It was also a good choice, being
comparatively small, manoeuvrable and easier to conceal than a gun. At the
same time, it has a huge calibre, which solves several technical problems.
Its muzzle velocity is considerably lower than that of a gun or a howitzer.
There is therefore no danger that the bomb will explode as it is fired or
that it will detonate accidentally. What could be better?
In 1970, a self-propelled version of the 240mm mortar was introduced.
It was installed on a tracked GMZ chassis. This greatly increased its
mobility, its ability to move across rough country and the protection
provided for the crew. This development further increased the affection
which the Soviet generals reserve for the mortar. At this period only Fronts
and General Headquarters reserves were equipped with these weapons. However,
Army and divisional commanders, as one man, implored every meeting they
attended at the Ministry of Defence to give each divisional commander a
battalion of these mortars and they also asked that each Army commander
should have at least a regiment of them. Their pleas were heard and soon
they received the mortars. And why not? It is after all, the simplest and
the most economical weapon imaginable.
It's all right for the generals, you will say, but what about the
battalion commanders? Must they be content with what their predecessors had
in the Second World War? The number of mortars in a battalion could hardly
be increased, for that would mean that half the infantry would have to be
reclassified as artillery. Nor is it possible to increase the calibre of
battalion mortars. This would make them too heavy to follow the infantry
wherever it goes.
A way out of this situation, too, has been found. In 1971 the `Vasilek'
automatic mortar was issued to battalions. Its introduction did not mean
that the insistence on simplicity had been dropped. This automatic weapon is
as uncomplicated as a Kalashnikov. When necessary, it can fire single shots.
As an automatic weapon it fires 120 bombs a minute. It differs from all
earlier mortars in being capable of both high and flat trajectory fire. It
can fire both normal and anti-tank bombs. If necessary, a battalion
commander can move his whole mortar battery to a sector threatened by enemy
tanks and can shower them with 720 anti-tank bombs every minute.
The Vasilek is being produced on a self-propelled, armoured chassis and
also in a towed variant. Six of them give a battalion commander greatly
increased capability to bring concentrated fire to bear on a decisive
sector.
Why do Calibres Vary?
1
When the Soviet Union first displayed the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle
in a parade, its designation and the calibre of its guns were unknown. From
careful examination of photographs, Western analysts concluded that the
calibre of the gun must be between 70 and 80mm. In this range there was only
one gun--the 76mm, which is still, as it has been for many years<,> a
standard weapon in both the Soviet Army and the Soviet Navy. This gun was
the most widely distributed of all Soviet artillery weapons before, during
and after the war and its calibre occurs again and again in designations of
Soviet equipment (e.g. T-34-76, the SU-76, the PT-76). Since this seemed a
safe deduction, Western handbooks listed the new Soviet vehicle as the
BMP-76.
Then several BMP-1s were captured in the Middle East and carefully
examined. To the amazement of the specialists, it was established that the
calibre of the gun was 73mm. This was virtually the same as the 76mm, so why
were the Soviet designers not using this trusted calibre? Why the variation?
Meanwhile, photographs of new Soviet tanks--the T-64 and T-72--had
begun to appear in Western journals. Painstaking analysis showed that the
calibre of the gun carried by both these tanks was 125mm. But this calibre
did not exist, either in the USSR or elsewhere. Many of the experts refused
to accept the analysts' conclusion, asserting that the new tanks must have
122mm guns. 122mm--like 76mm--is a standard calibre, which has been in
continuous use since before the Revolution. The 122 howitzer is the largest
in use in the Soviet Army. Most heavy armoured vehicles had and still have
guns of this calibre--the IS-2, IS-3, T-10, T10-M, SU-122, ISU-122, IT-122
and most recently the new, self-propelled `Gvozdika' howitzer, even though
this appeared considerably later than the T-64. But then the new Soviet
tanks began to appear abroad and all doubt ended--they did have 125mm guns.
What was all this about? Why were all previous standards being abandoned?
What lay behind it all?
2
The switch from existing calibres was not the result of a whim; rather,
it was a carefully thought-out policy--one which has a long history. It was
initiated by Stalin himself, a few hours before Germany's surprise attack on
the USSR.
It was on the eve of the war that the Soviet naval and coastal
artillery were first issued with the excellent 130mm gun. This was
subsequently used as an anti-tank gun and as a field gun and finally, in a
self-propelled variant. Also just before the war, in the spring of 1941, a
highly successful rocket launcher was developed in the USSR. This was the
BM-13, which could fire 16 130mm rockets simultaneously. It later became
known to the Soviet Army as the `Katyusha' and to the Germans as the `Stalin
Organ'. Naturally, the existence of both the gun and the rocket launcher
were kept entirely secret.
In the first days of June 1941 the new rocket launcher was shown to
members of the Politburo, in Stalin's presence. However, it was not fired,
because artillery shells instead of rockets had been delivered to the test
range. The mistake was understandable, in view of the great zeal with which
secrecy was being preserved--how could the ordinance officers possibly have
known of the existence of the 130mm rockets, which bore no resemblance to
artillery shells?
Knowing Stalin, those present assumed that everyone responsible for
this mistake would be shot immediately. However, Stalin told the Chekists
not to get involved and went back to Moscow.
The second demonstration took place on 21 June at Solnechnogorsk. This
time everything went off very well. Stalin was delighted with the rocket
launcher. Then and there, on the range, he signed an order authorising its
issue to the Soviet Army. However, he directed that henceforth, in order to
avoid confusion, the rockets should be referred to as 132mm, not as 130mm.
Accordingly, while the rocket launcher continued to be known as the
BM-13 (13cm being 130mm), the rockets were henceforth referred to, despite
their true calibre, as 132mm. That very night the war began.
During the war, projectiles of all types were fired in enormous
quantities, reaching astronomical totals. They were transported for
thousands of kilometres, under constant enemy attack. While they were being
moved they had to be trans-shipped again and again and this was done by
schoolboys, by old peasants, by convicts from prisons and camps, by German
prisoners and by Soviet soldiers who had only been in the army for two or
three days. Orders and requisitions for the rockets were passed hastily by
telephone from exchange to exchange and made all but inaudible by
interference. But there were no mistakes. Everyone could understand that `We
need 130s' was a reference to artillery shells and it was equally clear that
`1-3-2' meant rockets.
In 1942 the design of the rockets was modernised and their grouping
capability and destructive effect was improved. In the process, they became
slightly thicker, and their calibre was increased to 132mm--thus coming to
match their designation.
Stalin's decision had proved correct and, as a result, a series of
artillery weapons with unusual calibres were developed during the war. They
appeared, of course, only when an unusual shell or rocket was designed. For
instance, in 1941 a start was made with the development of a huge mortar
which was needed to fire a 40 kilogram bomb. The calibre of the mortar could
have been, for instance, 152mm, like the great majority of Soviet guns and
howitzers. Obviously, however, a howitzer shell would be unsuitable for a
mortar and vice versa. A mortar fires a particular type of projectile, which
must itself be of a certain calibre. This was the requirement which resulted
in the development of the 160mm mortar. Immediately after the war, 40mm
grenade launchers appeared. There had never before been a weapon of this
particular calibre in the Soviet Army. There were 37mm and 45mm shells. But
a grenade launcher uses its own type of projectile and a special calibre was
therefore selected for it.
Soviet designers took steps to correct past mistakes, which had been
tolerated until Stalin's sensible decision. The calibre of the standard
Soviet infantry weapon is 7.62mm. In 1930, a 7.62mm `TT' pistol was brought
into service, in addition to the existing rifles and machine-guns of this
calibre. Although their calibre is the same, the rounds for this pistol
cannot, of course, be used in either rifles or machine-guns.
In wartime, when everything is collapsing, when whole Armies and Groups
of Armies find themselves encircled, when Guderian and his tank Army are
charging around behind your own lines, when one division is fighting to the
death for a small patch of ground, and others are taking to their heels at
the first shot, when deafened switchboard operators, who have not slept for
several nights, have to shout someone else's incomprehensible orders into
telephones--in this sort of situation absolutely anything can happen.
Imagine that, at a moment such as this, a division receives ten truckloads
of 7.62mm cartridges. Suddenly, to his horror, the commander realises that
the consignment consists entirely of pistol ammunition. There is nothing for
his division's thousands of rifles and ma...
