Виктор Суворов. Советская Армия: взгляд изнутри (engl)
страница №6
...st what might happen in the future? What was the point ofsimply signing the agreement, after which nothing could be put right,
without letting a small group from each side catch a brief glimpse of things
as they were in the enemy camp? The agreement should not have been signed
without some arrangement of this sort.
Or if only, once the agreement had been signed, the Soviets had shown
their American opposite numbers something, not a film in a cinema, but
something real--in the most general terms, by all means, and without giving
any details away. The Soviet delegation, too, would have been not
uninterested to see something of the American achievements. But the Soviet
card-sharpers knew in advance that the Americans had at least three aces in
their hand, and that is why the Soviet side threw their cards on the table,
without showing them, and quickly proceeded to shuffle the pack.
Incidentally, shortly after this, having exploited the credulity of
America, the Soviet Union built an excellent rocket, with the industrial
index number 8-K-84 and the military designation UR-100. UR means `universal
rocket'. It can be used both to deliver a nuclear strike and to repel one.
It is the largest of the Soviet strategic rockets. Its manufacture is an
out-and-out violation of the SALT I agreement, but no protest has come from
the American side. This is because Ogarkov's organisation succeeded in
concealing the rocket's second function, so that it is officially regarded
as a purely offensive weapon. The SALT I agreement was got round in another
way, too. An excellent Soviet anti-aircraft rocket, the S-200, which was
developed to destroy enemy aircraft, was modernised and made suitable--with
certain limitations--for use against enemy missiles. Ogarkov's organisation
never allowed this rocket to appear at parades, even in its original,
anti-aircraft variant. The Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception is
strict in its observance of the principle: `The enemy should see only what
Ogarkov wishes to show them.' This is the reason why all foreign diplomats
were enabled to see the huge construction right in the very outskirts of
Moscow.
3
Ever since I first found myself in the West, I have been soaking up
information of all kinds. I have visited dozens of libraries, seen hundreds
of films. I have taken in everything, indiscriminately--James Bond,
Emmanuelle, Dracula, the Emperor Caligula, the Godfather, noble heroes and
crafty villains. To someone who had only seen films about the need to fulfil
production plans and to build a brighter future, it was impossible even to
imagine such variety. I kept on and on going to films. One day I went to an
excellent one about the burglary of a diamond warehouse. The thieves broke
into the enormous building with great skill, put a dozen alarms out of
action, opened enormously thick doors and finally reached the secret
innermost room in which the safes stood. Of course, in addition to all the
transmitters, alarm devices and so on, there were TV cameras, through which
a guard kept constant watch on what was happening in the room where the
safes were. But the thieves, too, were ingenious. They had with them a
photograph of the room, taken earlier. They put this in front of the cameras
and, using it as a screen, emptied the safes. The guards sensed that
something was happening. They began to feel vaguely uneasy. But looking at
the television screen they were able to convince themselves that everything
was quiet in the safe room.
I am sometimes told that the American spy-satellites are keeping a
careful watch on what is happening in the Soviet Union. They take infra-red
photographs of the country from above and from oblique angles, their
photographs are compared, electronic, heat and all other emissions are
measured, radio transmissions are intercepted and painstakingly analysed. It
is impossible to fool the satellites. When I hear this, I always think of
the trio of sympathetic villains who hid from the cameras behind a
photograph, using it as a shield behind which to fill their bags with
diamonds. Incidentally, the film ended happily for the thieves. When I
remember the cheerful smiles they exchanged at the end of their successful
operation, I also think of Ogarkov's beaming countenance at the moment the
agreement was signed.
The Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception does exactly what the
sympathetic trio did--they show the watchful eye of the camera a reassuring
picture, behind the shelter of which the gangsters who call themselves the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army, Military Industry and
so forth go about their business.
This is the way it is done in practice. A huge American computer, which
has been installed at the Central Command Post of the Chief Directorate of
Strategic Deception, maintains a constant record of all
intelligence-gathering satellites and orbiting space stations and of their
trajectories. Extremely precise short- and long-term forecasts are prepared
of the times at which the satellites will pass over various areas of the
Soviet Union and over all the other territories and sea areas in which the
Armed Services of the USSR are active. Each Chief Directorate unit serving
with a military district, a group of armies or a fleet makes use of data
provided by this same American computer to carry out similar work for its
own force and area. Each army, division and regiment receives constantly
up-dated schedules showing the precise times at which enemy reconnaissance
satellites will overfly their area, with details of the type of satellite
concerned (photo-reconnaissance, signals intelligence, all-purpose, etc.),
and the track it will follow. Neither the soldiers nor most of the officers
know the precise reason for daily orders, like `From 12.20 to 12.55 all
radio transmissions are to cease and all radars are to be switched off', but
they must obey them. At the same time, each division has several radio
transmitters and radars which work only during this period and which are
there solely to provide signals for the enemy's satellites.
The Chief Directorate has its own intelligence-gathering satellites,
but, unlike those working for the Chief Intelligence Directorate, they
maintain a watch over Soviet territory, looking constantly for radio
transmitters and radars which fail to observe the timetables laid down for
communication security. Severe punishments await divisional or regimental
commanders who are found to be ignoring the timetables.
In addition to these bogus signals, the Chief Directorate is constantly
organising nights by aircraft, tests of rockets, troop movements and other
operations to take place as the satellites' cameras pass overhead, with the
aim of emphasising one aspect of activity while concealing others. Thus, in
the period running up to the SALT I negotiations, every sort of attempt was
made to present a picture of Soviet activity and success in anti-missile
operations. After the negotiations, great pains were taken to hide activity
and successes in this field, since these represented a violation of the
agreements which had been reached. The Chief Directorate differs from our
resourceful burglars in presenting false pictures not for a few hours but
for decades. It has at its disposal not three crooks but tens of thousands
of highly-qualified specialists and almost unlimited powers in its dealings
with generals, marshals and those who run the military industries over the
concealment of the true state of affairs.
There is no doubt that these activities enable the Politburo, without
great difficulty, to empty the pockets of those in the West who will not
understand that they are dealing with organised crime, committed by a state
which is operating on a world-wide scale.
Part Three
Combat organisation
The Division
1
We have already seen that the unit known as a `motor-rifle regiment' in
the Soviet Army is in fact an all-arms unit with half the numerical strength
of brigades in Western armies, which is nevertheless equal or even superior
to the latter in fire-power and striking-power. This position is reached
through the merciless exploitation of Soviet soldiers, who are regarded
solely as fighting machines, rather than as human beings who require rest,
good food, recreation and so forth.
Having a strength of 2,000, a motor-rifle regiment is equipped with 41
battle tanks, 3 reconnaissance tanks, 100 armoured personnel carriers, 6
130mm heavy assault guns, 18 122mm self-propelled howitzers, 6 `Grad-P'
multiple rocket launchers, 18 self-propelled mortars, 18 automatic grenade
launchers, 4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 4 surface-to-air missile
complexes, 100 light anti-aircraft and several hundred light anti-tank
weapons, including the `Mukha', and the RPG-16 anti-tank rocket launchers,
both portable and mounted on vehicles, together with the requisite engineer,
chemical warfare, medical, repair and other supporting sub-units.
A modern Soviet tank regiment is organised along almost exactly the
same lines as a motor-rifle, regiment, except that it has three tank
battalions rather than one and one motor-rifle battalion instead of three.
Its other sub-units are exactly the same: a battalion of self-propelled
artillery, a battery of multiple rocket launchers, an anti-aircraft battery,
reconnaissance, communications, engineering, chemical warfare and repair
companies. The strength of such a regiment is 1,300. It has considerably
fewer light anti-tank weapons than a motor-rifle regiment, reasonably enough
in a regiment with a total of 97 tanks, since tank guns are the best of all
anti-tank weapons.
2
A Soviet motor-rifle division is more of an all-arms unit than a
motor-rifle regiment, containing, as it does, sub-units with the most varied
functions and capabilities. The organisation of a division is simple and
well-balanced. The strength of a motor-rifle division is 13,000. It is
commanded by a Major-General. It is made up of:
A headquarters staff.
A communications battalion--the division's nerve-system, used for
communications with all its elements, with the higher command and with
neighbouring divisions.
A reconnaissance battalion--the eyes and ears of the division.
A rocket battalion--the most powerful weapon in the hands of the
divisional commander, with six launchers which can fire chemical and nuclear
weapons for distances of up to 150 kilometres.
An independent tank battalion--the divisional commander's bodyguard,
which protects divisional headquarters and the rocket battalion, and which
can be used in battle when the divisional commander needs all his resources.
A tank regiment--the division's striking force.
Three motor-rifle regiments, two of which are equipped with armoured
personnel carriers and light weapons and which attack on a wide front during
an offensive, probing for weak spots in the enemy's defences. The third
regiment, equipped with infantry combat vehicles and with heavy weapons, is
used with the tank regiment to attack the enemy at his weakest point--`in
the liver' as the Soviet Army says.
An artillery regiment--the main fire-power of the division--which
consists of three battalions of 152 self-propelled howitzers and one
battalion of BM-27 heavy multiple rocket launchers. In all, the regiment has
54 howitzers and 18 heavy rocket launchers. The full strength of the
regiment is used in the division's main axis of advance, in which the tank
and heavy motor-rifle regiments are also active--that is, in the area in
which the enemy has been proved to be most vulnerable.
The anti-aircraft (SAM) regiment has as its primary task the protection
of the divisional headquarters and of the rocket battalion. It must also
provide protection for the division's main battle group, even though this is
already capable of defending itself against enemy aircraft. The regiment has
five batteries, each with six rocket launchers. In peacetime, two of the
launchers of each battery are held in reserve and the fact that they exist
must not in any circumstances be disclosed until the outbreak of war. This
has led Western experts to underestimate the defence capabilities of Soviet
divisions, believing that each regiment has only 20 launchers whereas in
fact it has 30. In order to maintain this illusion, the armies of all the
Soviet allies actually do have only 20 launchers in each regiment.
The anti-tank battalion acts as the divisional commander's trump card
when he finds himself in a critical situation. Until then it is kept in
reserve. It is brought into action during a defensive action, when the
enemy's tanks have broken through fairly deeply and once the direction of
his main thrust can be clearly identified. In an offensive it is used when
the division's main battle force has broken through in depth and the enemy
is attacking its flank and rear. The battalion is armed with 18 100 or 125mm
anti-tank guns and six anti-tank missile complexes.
The engineer battalion is used, together with the anti-tank battalion,
to lay minefields rapidly in front of enemy tanks which have broken through,
in order to stop them or at least to slow them down in front of the
division's anti-tank guns. It also clears mines ahead of the division's
advancing troops during an offensive and helps them to cross water
obstacles.
The chemical warfare battalion carries out the measures necessary for
defence against nuclear, chemical or biological attacks by the enemy.
The transport battalion supplies the division with fuel and with
ammunition. Its 200 vehicles enable it to move 1,000 tons of fuel and
ammunition at the same time.
The repair battalion recovers and replaces combat equipment.
The medical battalion does the same, but for the division's personnel.
The helicopter flight, which has 6 helicopters, is used for command and
communications duties and to land the division's diversionary troops behind
the enemy's lines.
The division has a total of 34 battalions. Those battalions which are
subordinated directly to the divisional commander are given the designation
`independent'--for instance `Independent Communications Battalion of the
24th Division'. This system is also used in all higher formations. For
instance, an Army consists of divisions. But it also contains regiments and
battalions which do not form part of its complement, which are called
`independent' as, for instance in the `41st Independent Pontoon Bridge
Regiment of the 13th Army'.
The total complement of a Soviet motor-rifle division is 287 tanks, 150
infantry combat vehicles, 221 armoured personnel carriers, 6 rocket
launchers, 18 130mm heavy assault guns, 18 anti-tank guns, 126
self-propelled and towed howitzers, 96 mortars and multiple rocket
launchers, 46 mobile anti-aircraft missile complexes, 16 self-propelled
automatic anti-aircraft guns, and hundreds of light anti-tank and
anti-aircraft weapons.
3
A tank division is organised in the same way as a motor-rifle division,
except that it has three tank regiments rather than one and one motor-rifle
regiment instead of three. In addition, a tank division has no independent
tank or anti-tank battalions, since its anti-tank strength is much greater
than that of a motor-rifle division.
A tank division has 10,500 men. It is equipped with 341 tanks, 232
infantry combat vehicles, 6 rocket launchers, 6 heavy assault guns, 126
self-propelled howitzers, 78 mortars and multiple rocket launchers, 62
self-propelled anti-aircraft missiles and artillery complexes and hundreds
of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. While it has fewer personnel,
a tank division has far greater striking power than a motor-rifle division.
The Army
1
Until the mid-1950s, divisions were organised in corps, and a number of
corps made up an Army. However, because of the greatly increased combat
strength of the divisions, and also because an Army Commander had acquired
the means to control all his divisions simultaneously, the corps came to be
considered unnecessary as an intermediate formation and was therefore
abolished.
Today, however, a relatively small number of corps are left in the
Soviet armed forces. They exist where a division is too small a unit for the
task in hand and an Army too large.
From time to time in this book we have used the term `All-Arms Army'.
This has been done in order to distinguish this type of Army from Tank
Armies, Air Armies, Air Defence Armies and Rocket Armies. However, in normal
usage the expression `all-arms' is not used; instead, the units concerned
are simply referred to as the 13th or the 69th Army. Some have honorary
titles, such as `2nd Shock Army' or `9th Guards Army'. These titles add
nothing to the present-day strength of these armies--they are simply
reflections of past glory. For instance, the 3rd Army, which has no honorary
title, is considerably better equipped than the 11th Guards Army.
Sometimes Armies evolve along new lines but keep their former
designations, which do not fit their present functions. Thus, the 2nd Tank
Army is now an All-Arms Army. By contrast, the 3rd Shock Army, despite its
designation, is in fact a Tank Army.
During the Second World War the Red Army had a total of 18 Air Armies,
11 Air Defence Armies, 6 Guards Tank Armies, and 70 other armies, of which 5
were known as Shock Armies and 11 as Guards Armies.
Today there are fewer armies but their strengths vary considerably. The
Soviet Armed Forces now have 3 Rocket Armies, 10 Air Defence Armies, 16 Air
Armies, 8 Guards Tank Armies and 33 other armies, a number of which are
still referred to as either Shock or Guards Armies.
2
In the West it is firmly believed that today's Soviet Armies lack a
clear organisational structure. A superficial analysis of the complement of
each of the Soviet Armies seems to confirm this: some Armies have 7
divisions while others have only 3. The proportion of tank and motor-rifle
divisions which they contain also varies constantly.
In fact, though, Armies do have quite clear organisational structures.
However, the Soviet Union does not think it advisable to display this
clarity in peacetime; this would throw too much light on their plans for
war. Divisions have a high degree of administrative autonomy and can be
quickly regrouped from one Army to another. In peacetime the system
certainly does seem illogical, but once a war began each Army would take on
an entirely clear shape.
There is one further cause for this apparent confusion. This is that
the Soviet Union has forbidden its East European allies to establish Armies
in either peacetime or wartime. If a homogeneous mass becomes too large it
may explode. The Soviet High Command avoids this danger within the Soviet
Army itself, by constantly moving the various nationalities around, to
produce a featureless grey mass of soldiery, unable to understand one
another. In peacetime, the armed forces of the East European countries only
have divisions. In wartime these divisions would immediately join Soviet
Armies which were under strength. This is precisely what happened in the
summer of 1968.
In peacetime, these East European divisions see themselves as part of
their own national armed forces. In wartime they would be distributed
throughout the Soviet Armies; for administrative purposes they would come
under their national Ministries of Defence and, ultimately, under the
Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. For military purposes
they would be subordinated to the Soviet Armies, Fronts and Strategic
Directions and, ultimately, to the Soviet Supreme Commander and to his
General Staff. It is because of this that the Staff of the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation is a bureaucratic institution rather than operational
headquarters. And this is why, in peacetime, many Soviet Armies appear
unstructured. In wartime they would be brought up to strength with East
European contingents and they would then assume their proper forms.
3
In wartime an Army consists of five divisions, one of which is a tank
division, and the remaining four motor-rifle divisions. In various instances
in which the mass use of tanks would be difficult, an Army may have nothing
but motor-rifle divisions, which have only a limited number of tanks. But
the Armies which are earmarked to operate in Western Europe are made up in
this way--one tank and four motor-rifle divisions.
Besides these five divisions each Army has:
A headquarters staff--the brain of the Army.
A communications regiment--its nervous system.
An independent SPETSNAZ diversionary company and two signals
intelligence battalions--its eyes and ears.
A rocket brigade--the most powerful weapon in the hands of the Army's
commander, which enables him to deliver nuclear and chemical attacks.
Earlier each brigade had 9 launchers, with a range of up to 300 kilometres.
Today a brigade has 18 launchers, with a greatly increased range.
An independent tank battalion--the Army Commander's personal guard.
This defends the Army's control post and the rocket brigade and is brought
into action only in the most critical situations, when everything is at
stake.
An artillery brigade--the main fire-power of the Army. This consists of
five battalions--three with 18 130mm guns each, one with 18 152 mm
gun-howitzers and one with 18 BM-27 multiple rocket launchers.
An anti-aircraft brigade, which covers the Army's command Post and
Rocket Brigades with its fire and which also operates in the Army's main
axis of advance, supplementing the anti-aircraft coverage which the
divisions can provide for themselves. This brigade consists of a command
battalion, a supply battalion and three fire-battalions, each with three
batteries.
The camouflage service has decreed that one of the launchers in each of
these batteries is never to show itself. It therefore appears to observers
that these batteries consist of three launchers, whereas in fact they have
four, one of which is always kept in reserve. An anti-aircraft brigade is
therefore generally believed to have 27 launchers, whereas in fact it has
36.
An anti-aircraft regiment, which has 30 57mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns.
Experience in Vietnam and in wars in the Middle East has shown that
conventional anti-aircraft artillery has by no means outlived its usefulness
and that there are many situations in which the effectiveness of
anti-aircraft rockets falls off sharply and that anti-aircraft guns can
supplement these most usefully.
An anti-tank regiment, which consists of three battalions. This has 57
heavy anti-tank guns and 18 anti-tank missile complexes.
An independent anti-tank battalion, which has 40 IT-1 tracked anti-tank
rocket launchers. The existence of these battalions, and of the IT-1 itself,
is a carefully guarded secret. These batteries do not form part of the
anti-tank regiment, and there is a sound reason for this, since they carry
out operations using quite different tactics. The independent anti-tank
battalions, with their highly mobile launchers, harass the enemy constantly,
making surprise attacks from vehicles and manoeuvring from area to area
under the pressure exerted by the enemy's superior forces. Meanwhile the
anti-tank regiment, armed with more powerful but less manoeuvrable guns, has
the task of stopping the enemy tanks, at absolutely any cost, when they
reach a previously defined line. Thus the more mobile battalion goes into
action against the enemy's tanks from the momient the latter break through,
while the anti-tank regiment, deep in the rear, is preparing an impassable
barrier, behind which it will fight to the last man.
The helicopter squadron is used for communications and for control, and
sometimes to land troops behind the enemy lines. It has 16 medium and 4
heavy helicopters.
The Army's supporting sub-units include:
An engineer regiment
A pontoon bridge regiment
An independent assault crossing battalion
A transport regiment
An independent pipe-laying battalion
A chemical warfare battalion
A medical battalion
A mobile tank-repair workshop, with a tank recovery company
In wartime the complement of an Army is 83,000. It has 1,541 tanks, 48
rocket launchers, 832 infantry combat vehicles, 1,100 armoured personel
carriers, 1,386 guns, mortars and multiple rocket launchers, 376 heavy
anti-aircraft missile launchers and anti-aircraft guns, 40 transport
helicopters and thousands of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.
4
A Tank Army, like an All-Arms Army, has a permanent complement which is
strictly observed. Its organisation is standardised with that of an All-Arms
Army. It is therefore simpler not to list the rocket brigade, the
diversionary company and so forth but simply to pick out the features which
distinguish a Tank Army from an All-Arms Army. There are three such
features:
(1) An All-Arms Army has five divisions, one of which is a tank
division. A Tank Army has only four, all of which are tank divisions.
(2) A Tank Army does not break through the enemy's defences. This is
done for it by the All-Arms Armies. Therefore a Tank Army does not have an
artillery brigade, of which it has no need. But while it is operating deep
in the defences of the enemy it may suddenly encounter strong enemy forces
against which massed intense fire must be brought down very quickly. For
this purpose, in place of an artillery brigade, a Tank Army has a regiment
of BM-27 multiple rocket launchers.
(3) A Tank Army does not fight to hold areas or lines: its task is
solely to attack the enemy. It therefore has no anti-tank regiment (which
holds territory) or independent anti-tank battalion (which harasses the
advancing enemy). It has no need of these sub-units, which would contribute
nothing to its proper function.
In the near future there will be one further special feature in the
organisation of a Tank Army. It will include an air-borne assault brigade,
which has the function of seizing and holding bridges, crossing points and
road junctions ahead of the avalanche of advancing tanks. At present only
Fronts have these brigades. Temporarily, until they come into service, Tank
Armies are forced to use motor-rifle regiments, or sometimes divisions,
which have battalions with special training in helicopter assault landings.
Once the air-borne assault brigades join the Tank Armies, the need for such
motor-rifle regiments and divisions will disappear.
In all, in wartime, a Tank Army has 54,000 men, 1,416 tanks, 993
infantry combat vehicles, 894 guns, mortars and multiple rocket launchers,
42 rocket launchers, 314 heavy anti-aircraft missile launchers and
anti-aircraft guns, 64 combat and 34 transport helicopters and thousands of
light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.
5
If we compare the weapons available to an All-Arms Army with those of a
tank Army, we discover an apparently paradoxical situation; the Tank Army
has fewer tanks than the All-Arms Army, but more infantry combat vehicles
than the latter, whose very foundation is its motor-rifle sub-units!
In fact, though, this is not a paradox. An All-Arms Army is a
combination of tanks, of heavy and light motorised infantry, artillery and
other forces whose job is to break through the enemy's lines.
A Tank Army is far smaller than an All-Arms Army. It is a combination
of tanks and heavy infantry, with artillery and operational helicopter
sub-units, whose job it is to operate deep in the enemy's rear.
An All-Arms Army has more than 1,000 armoured personnel carriers (for
light infantry) and a Tank Army has practically none.
A Tank Army, being smaller, has far better cross-country performance,
and greater manoeuvrability and striking power. It has fewer tanks than an
All-Arms Army, but they are far more highly concentrated. This gives the
Tank Army a clearly defined offensive character, while the All-Arms Army is
essentially a universal weapon.
The Front
1
The Front is a group of Armies, unified under a single command to carry
out combat operations in wartime. It is set up either during or immediately
before the outbreak of a war. It is an all-arms formation in every respect,
incorporating elements of the various Armed Services.
The Commander of a Front has an operational, not an administrative
function. He possesses very considerable authority and the forces under his
command are not subordinate to the Commanders-in-Chief of their respective
Services. The different Services from which the forces making up a Front are
drawn are not permitted to interfere in the operational use of these forces.
A Front Commander has sole and personal responsibility for the preparation,
conduct and outcome of combat operations. He is subordinated either to the
Commander-in-Chief of a Strategic Direction who is in control of operations
or directly to the Supreme Commander himself. The Armed Services from which
the forces making up a Front are taken are concerned only with the
reinforcement, reequipment, provisioning and supply of these forces.
This clear differentiation between operational and administrative
functions makes it possible to concentrate complete authority in individual
hands, to avoid duplication of control, to ensure proper cooperation between
sub-units of different Armed Services and to avoid friction between them.
At the beginning of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, five
Fronts were created. In the course of the war their number was increased to
fifteen. During its final stages the Fronts operating in the Central
Direction were made up of 1 or 2 Air Armies, 2 or 3 Tank Armies, 8 or 9
All-Arms Armies and a considerable number of independent tank, artillery and
motor-rifle corps. These Fronts had strengths of up to a million soldiers,
three thousand tanks, three thousand aircraft, and up to fifteen thousand
guns and mortars.
2
After the war, because of the introduction of nuclear weapons and as
part of the continuous technical improvement of the Armed Forces, it was
decided that in any future war more powerful, more compact and therefore
more easily controlled Fronts would be used.
Contrary to the belief held in the West, Fronts have a quite clearly
defined combat organisation, like battalions, regiments, divisions and
armies.
A Front comprises:
A command staff.
A communications regiment--the nerve system.
A diversionary `SPETSNAZ' brigade, a signals intelligence regiment and
a radar battlefield surveillance regiment--the eyes and ears of the Front.
An Air Army.
A Tank Army--the Front's striking force.
Two All-Arms Armies.
An independent tank brigade--the Front Commander's personal guard,
which defends his command post and the Front's rocket brigades. This brigade
is only brought into action in the most critical situations.
Two rocket brigades. One has 12 launchers with a range of 9-1,200
kilometres and is used in accordance with the plans of the Front Commander.
The second brigade is similar in composition and armament to an Army's
rocket brigade and is used to strengthen the Army which is having the
greatest success.
An artillery division, consisting of six regiments and an anti-tank
battalion. Three of the regiments have 54 130mm M46 guns each and two of the
remainder have 54 152mm D20 howitzers each. The other regiment has 54 240mm
mortars. The artillery division, in its entirety, is used, to strengthen the
artillery of the Army which is having the greatest success.
A specially strengthened artillery brigade, consisting of five
battalions. The first three each have 12 180mm S-23 guns, the other two each
have 12 203mm B-4M howitzers. The brigade is used to strengthen the Army
which is having the greatest success.
A tank-destroyer brigade, of five battalions, armed with 90 heavy
anti-tank guns and 30 anti-tank rocket complexes.
Two anti-aircraft missile brigades and two anti-aircraft artillery
regiments, equipped and organised like similar sub-units in an Army.
An airborne assault brigade, used for the rapid capture of important
lines, bridges, crossings and mountain passes in support of the Front's
advancing forces. In the next few years commanders of the Tank Armies of a
Front will also each have one such brigade.
Several penal battalions, which are used to negotiate minefields and
for attacks on strongly fortified enemy positions. The number of penal
battalions available depends on the numbers of soldiers and officers who are
unwilling to fight for socialism.
The supporting sub-units include:
An engineer brigade.
A pontoon bridge brigade.
An assault-crossing battalion.
A transport brigade.
A pipe-laying regiment.
A CW protection regiment.
Several field and evacuation hospitals.
A mobile tank repair workshop.
A tank transport regiment.
In territories in which it is difficult to use tanks, a Front will have
no Tank Armies. Instead of these it may have an independent tank division
but it may not have this either. This does not, of course, apply to Western
Europe.
Fronts earmarked for operations in Western Europe will have up to 5,600
tanks, 772 combat aircraft, 220 helicopters, 3,000 infantry combat vehicles,
3,000 armoured personnel carriers, and up to 4,100 guns, mortars and
salvo-firing rocket-launchers together with a large quantity of other arms
and combat equipment.
3
It will, of course, be pointed out that the forces stationed on East
German territory are precisely twice as strong as those I have listed,
having:
Not one Tank Army, but two
An Air Army which has a considerably larger number of aircraft than I
have shown
Two airborne assault brigades, rather than one
Not one diversionary brigade, but two
Four rocket brigades, instead of two
Two engineer brigades, not one
Two pontoon bridge brigades, rather than one
An artillery division which has more than 700 guns, as against the 324
listed above
How can this be explained? There is nothing mysterious about it. A
Front advancing against a strong enemy may have a zone of advance of 200-250
kilometres. In East Germany there is thus room for two Fronts. In
Czechoslovakia there is room for only one.
Two routes lead from East Germany to the West, separated from each
other by a considerable distance. Because of this, it is convenient to
employ two different Fronts; control over a single Front advancing in two
different directions is bound to produce difficulties. If the Soviet forces
are supplemented with East German units there will be precisely two Fronts
in the GDR. No publicity is given to this intention in peacetime, in order
to keep it secret. Besides, it is quite simply inconvenient to keep two
generals of equal seniority in the same country. For the senior Soviet
officer in the GDR is not only a military commander, he is also the
administrative head of a Communist colony. For this reason the staffs of the
Fronts are unified, although even for annual exercises they separate, as do
the Air Armies and the artillery divisions. A single telephone call is all
that is needed to set up two separate fronts--everything else has been
arranged already.
Why are there 20 Soviet Divisions in Germany, but only 5 in Czechoslovakia?
1
The Soviet Union maintains 10 motor-rifle, 1 artillery and 9 tank
divisions in East Germany. In Poland it has 2 tank divisions, in
Czechoslovakia it has 2 tank and 3 motor-rifle divisions. In the
Byelorussian Military District, which borders on Poland, it has 9 tank and 4
motor-rifle divisions; Poland has 5 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions,
Czechoslovakia has 5 tank and 5 motor-rifle divisions.
At first sight, these figures seem to be an arbitrary and nonsensical
jumble.
However, let us recall the basic fact that the East European divisions,
brigades and regiments are not permitted to form their own Armies or Fronts.
They simply form parts of various Soviet Armies, taking the place of missing
elements. We should therefore not regard Soviet and East European divisions
as separate entities. Instead, we should see them as forces of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation, without national distinctions. Once we do this, we see
an entirely harmonious picture.
Let us take Czechoslovakia as an example. In Prague there is a Soviet
Colonel-General, who commands the Central Group of Forces. Under him are the
staffs of an Air Army and of two All-Arms Armies. The Air Army has a
complement of only 150 Soviet combat aircraft, but, if we add to these 500
Czech combat aircraft, we have a complete Air Army, with a Soviet general at
its head.
Altogether in Czechoslovakia there are 7 tank and 8 motor-rifle
divisions. This is exactly the number needed to make up a Front. 4 of the
tank divisions constitute a Tank Army. 2 of the remaining tank divisions and
the 8 motor-rifle divisions form two Armies and the remaining tank division
acts as a reserve. In peacetime, Czechoslovakia has two artillery brigaides
and two anti-tank regiments. This is exactly what is needed to complete two
Armies, but the Tank Army does not need these sub-units. Czechoslovakia has
three rocket brigades and this is precisely what is needed--one brigade for
each Army, including the Tank Army. All the front-line sub-units are Soviet.
The Soviet Colonel-General in Prague is the Commander of the Central
Front. The commanders of the Air Army and of the two All-Arms Armies are
also Soviet, while the divisions, brigades and regiments are both Soviet and
Czech, but all are entirely under Soviet control. Already in peacetime,
there is a complete Front in Czechoslovakia; only one element is lacking--a
headquarters staff for the Tank Army. Everything else is there. However,
five hundred kilometres from the Soviet-Czech frontier, in the small
Ukrainian town of Zhitomir, is the staff of the 8th Guards Tank Army. This
staff has no one under its command. So that the generals should not become
bored, they frequently make trips to Czechoslovakia to inspect the tank
divisions. Then they return home. All that would be needed to move them to
Czechoslovakia is a two-hour flight by passenger aircraft. Once this is done
the Central Front is ready for battle.
In Warsaw, too, there is a Soviet Colonel-General. He also has at his
disposal the headquarters staff of an Air Army (the 37th Air Army which has
360 combat aircraft) but he has only two Soviet tank divisions. There are no
staffs for land armies, for it would be odd to have three Army staffs for
two tank divisions. So the Soviet Colonel-General has a huge staff in
Legnica on which there are sufficient generals to form both the headquarters
staff of a Front and those of three Armies. And in Poland, too, there are
just the right number of divisions to form a Front--7 tank and 8
motor-rifle. As in Czechoslovakia, there are 4 tank divisions--a Tank
Army--2 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions--two Armies--and one tank division,
to act as a reserve. There are exactly the number of auxiliary sub-units
needed for the Front and for the Armies from which it is made up. The number
of combat aircraft is sufficient to reinforce both the 37th Air Army and the
Air Army in Czechoslovakia.
In peacetime there is already a complete Front in Poland; it needs no
further strengthening. The transformation of the Soviet staff in Legnica
into a headquarters staff for a Front and staffs for three Land Armies can
take place automatically. In 1968 it was completed in a matter of minutes.
What appears to be one staff, in fact, functions, even in peacetime, as four
independent staffs; they are all located in one place in order to camouflage
this fact.
In East Germany there are two Fronts. The overall total of Soviet and
East German aircraft is precisely the number needed to make up two Air
Armies. The staff of the 16th Air Army is already stationed in East Germany;
that of the 1st Air Army can be brought from Byelorussia in a single
transport aircraft within a couple of hours and once this has been done the
two Fronts have their complete contingent.
In peacetime, there are two Tank Army staffs in East Germany--each
Front has one--and three staffs for All-Arms Armies. In other words, one
more is needed. This, too--the staff of the 28th Army--would come from
Byelorussia, in a single aircraft and within two hours. There would then be
two Fronts, each with one Air Army, one Tank Army and Two All-Arms Armies.
The move of the staffs can be accomplished so quickly because it is only
necessary to move five generals and twelve colonels for each staff--the
remainder are already in East Germany.
In all, there are 1 tank and 14 motor-rifle divisions in East Germany.
Each Front needs a minimum of 6 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions. Thus only
three more divisions are needed and they, too, would come from Byelorussia.
This would take twenty-four hours. The two Fronts could begin combat
operations without them and they, too, would be in action within a day.
But what about poor Byelorussia, robbed of the staff of an Air Army,
the staff of an All-Arms Army and three divisions--one tank and two
motor-rifle? She has plenty left.
To be specific, she has a Colonel-General and his staff, two rocket
brigades, two anti-aircraft SAM brigades, a diversionary brigade, an
airborne assault brigade, the staffs of the 5th and 7th Guards Tank Armies
and eight tank divisions--four with each Tank Army.
2
With a very small number of moves--three Army staffs and three
divisions--we have produced a structure which has the precision and harmony
of a mathematical formula.
We now have the following picture:
In the first echelon there are three Fronts, two in East Germany, one
in Czechoslovakia.
In the second echelon--one Front in Poland. In the third echelon--a
Group of Tank Armies.
The seaward flank is covered by the Soviet Baltic Fleet which in
wartime would incorporate all the ships of the Polish and East German
Navies.
At the head of each of these formations is a Commander. Above him is
the Commander-in-Chief, whose headquarters is at Zossen-Wünsdorf. There
could be no better place for a headquarters anywhere in the world. It is
very close to West Berlin which, with its immediate surroundings would, of
course, be immune from Western nuclear attacks. The C-in-C makes use of West
Berlin as a hostage and as a safeguard; he is thoroughly protected against
conventional weapons by concrete shelters and by Tank Armies.
Each Army has one tank and four motor-rifle divisions. Each Tank Army
has four tank divisions. Each Front has one Air Army, one Tank Army and two
All-Arms Armies. The Group of Tank Armies has two Tank Armies. In all, each
Front has six tank and eight motor-rifle divisions. There are a total of six
Tank Armies and eight All-Arms Armies. The Strategic Direction has four
Fronts (All-Arms) and one Group of Tank Armies.
The Armies of this Strategic Directorate have a total of 32 tank
divisions and 32 motor-rifle divisions.
In addition, the C-in-C of the Western Strategic Direction has at his
disposal two tank divisions, one in Poland, the other in Czechoslovakia and
two airborne divisions (the 6th Polish and the 103rd Guards division, which
is in Byelorussia).
Also at the disposal of the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction are a
diversionary long-range reconnaissance SPETSNAZ regiment, a regiment of
pilotless `Yastreb' reconnaissance aircraft, a Guards communications
brigade, a transport brigade, a division of railway troops, a pipe-laying
brigade, a CW protection brigade, an engineer brigade, a pontoon bridge
brigade and other sub-units.
For the duration of a particular operation he may have temporary
command of:
One Corps from the Strategic Rocket Forces
One--or in some cases all three--Corps from the Long Range Air Force
One Army from the National Air Defence Forces
The whole of Military Transport Aviation
3
The Western Strategic Directorate is the mightiest grouping of forces
on this planet. It has the task of breaking through the West's defences to
rescue the West Europeans from the fetters of capitalism. The plan for its
operational use is simple--a simultaneous attack by all three Fronts. The
Front which is most successful will be immediately strengthened by the
addition of the second echelon Front from Poland, which has the task of
smashing through the enemy's defences, after which the Group of Tank Armies
will be used to widen the breach, supported by parachute drops by the
airborne divisions. Divisions which suffer heavy losses will not be
reinforced but will be immediately withdrawn from battle and replaced by
fresh divisions from the Moscow, Volga or Urals Military Districts. In the
event of a breakthrough into France, the Western Strategic Direction may be
allocated a further Group of Tank Armies, which is located in the Kiev
Military District in peacetime and is made up of the 3rd and 6th Guards Tank
Armies.
It must be emphasised that the task of the C-in-C of the Western
Strategic Direction is to advance swiftly westwards and to concentrate all
his efforts on this and this alone. He is covered on the south by neutral
Austria and Switzerland, which, it is planned, will be liberated somewhat
later, while on the north of the Strategic Directorate lie the West German
`Land' of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. A plan has been devised to prevent
the forces of the Directorate from moving northwards as well as westwards.
The Baltic Military District will become the Baltic Front in wartime. It
will not come under the command of the Western Strategic Directorate but
will be independent--in other words it will be subordinated directly to the
Supreme Commander. This Front will cross Polish territory into Germany and
will deploy northwards, with the task of covering the northern flank of the
Western Strategic Directorate, of liberating Denmark and of seizing the
Baltic Straits. Because it will have to work on a very narrow front and to
carry out operations on islands, the composition of the Front has been
somewhat modified. It will include:
The 30th Air Army
The 9th and 11th Guards Armies, each consisting of one tank division
and of three motor-rifle divisions instead of four
One tank division, rather than a Tank Army
An artillery division and all the remaining units which ordinarily
constitute a Front.
As compensation for the divisions it lacks, the Front has one most
unusual component--a Polish marine infantry division. In addition, the
Soviet 107th Guards Airborne Division will operate in support of the Front,
although it will not be subordinated to it.
To the North another Front will operate, independently of any Strategic
Direction, subordinated directly to the Supreme Commander. This Front will
be established on the base provided by the Leningrad Military District. It
will be made up of one Air Army, two All-Arms Armies and an independent tank
division. An airborne division based in the Leningrad Military District, but
not subordinated to it, will provide operational support. This Front will
operate against Norway and, possibly, Sweden.
The Organisation of the South-Western Strategic Direction
1
The South-Western Strategic Direction stands shoulder to shoulder with
the Western and is organised in exactly the same way: three Fronts in the
first echelon, one Front in the second echelon, a Group of Tank Armies in
the third echelon, and a seaward flank protected by the Black Sea Fleet,
which would be joined in wartime by all the ships of the Bulgarian and
Romanian navies.
Unlike its Western equivalent, the South-Western Strategic Direction
covers terrain which is unsuitable for the deployment of a large quantity of
tanks. In addition, of course, the enemy is not as strong here as he is in
the West. The Fronts of the South-Western Strategic Direction therefore have
no Tank Armies. Each Front consists of an Air Army and two All-Arms Armies.
The staffs for all the Armies are brought from military districts in
the USSR. In order to examine the structure of this Strategic Direction, we
will do two things: we will assume five Bulgarian tank brigades to equal two
tank divisions--an equation which any military specialist will confirm is
reasonable. We will also move one Soviet motor-rifle division forward just
200 metres from the town of Uzhgorod on to Hungarian territory. We will then
have the following picture:
In Hungary there are 3 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions. The Front
there will consist of two Armies ea...
