Виктор Суворов. Советская Армия: взгляд изнутри (engl)
страница №8
... unanimously asserted thatany nuclear war would begin with a first stage during which only
conventional weapons would be used. Then, after a certain period, each side
would begin, uncertainly and irresolutely at first, to use nuclear weapons
of the lowest calibre. Gradually, larger and larger nuclear weapons would be
brought into action. These theorists hold varying views on the period which
this escalation would take, ranging from a few weeks to several months.
Being unopposed, this theory was to be found in the pages of both
serious studies and light novels--the latter being fantasies with happy
endings, in which a nuclear war was brought to a halt in such a way that it
could never recur.
The theory that a nuclear war would take a long time to build up
originated in the West at the beginning of the nuclear age. It is
incomprehensible and absurd, and it completely mystifies Soviet marshals.
For a long time there was a secret debate at the highest levels of the
Soviet government--have the Western politicians and generals gone off their
heads or are they bluffing? It was concluded that, of course, no one really
believed in the theory but that it had been thought up in order to hide what
Western policy-makers really believed about the subject. But then the
question arose: for whose benefit could such an unconvincing and, to put it
mildly, such a silly idea have been dreamed up? Presumably not for that of
the Soviet leadership. The theory is too naive for specialists to believe.
That must mean that it was devised for the ignorant and for the popular
masses in the West, to reassure the man in the street.
2
The first American film I ever saw was The Magnificent Seven with Yul
Brynner in the main role. At that time all I knew about the Americans was
what Communist propaganda said about them and I had not believed that since
my earliest childhood. Thus it was from a cowboy film that I began to try to
form my own independent opinions about the American people and about the
principles by which they live.
American films are not often shown in the Soviet Union, but after The
Magnificent Seven I did not miss a single one. The country as I saw it on
the screen pleased me and the people even more so--good-looking, strong,
masculine and decisive. It seemed that the Americans spent all their time in
the saddle, riding on marvellous horses in blazing sunlight through deserts,
shooting down villains without mercy. My heart belonged only to America. I
worshipped the Americans--in particular for the decisiveness with which they
kept down the number of crooks in their society. The heroes of American
films would submit for long periods and with great patience to humiliation
and insults and were cheated at every turn, but matters were always settled
with a dramatically decisive gunfight. The two enemies gaze unflinchingly
into each other's eyes. Each has his hands tensely over his holsters. No
exchange of curses, no insults, not a superfluous movement. Dramatic
silence. Both are calm and collected. Clearly death has spread its black
wings above them. The gunfight itself almost represents death, for each of
them. They look long and hard into each other's eyes. Suddenly and
simultaneously both of them realise, not from what they see or hear, not
with their minds or their hearts but from pure animal instinct, that the
moment has come. Two shots ring out as one. It is impossible to detect the
moment at which they draw their guns and pull the triggers. The denouement
is instantaneous, without preamble. A corpse rolls on the ground.
Occasionally there are two corpses. Usually the villain is killed but the
hero is only wounded. In the hand.
Many years passed and I became an officer serving with the General
Staff. Suddenly, as I studied American theories of war, I came to an
appalling realisation. It became clear to me that a modern American cowboy
who is working up to a decisive fight will always expect to begin by
spitting at and insulting his opponent and to continue by throwing whisky in
his face and chucking custard pies at him before resorting to more serious
weapons. He expects to hurl chairs and bottles at his enemy and to try to
stick a fork or a tableknife into his behind and then to fight with his
fists and only after all this to fight it out with his gun.
This is a very dangerous philosophy. You are going to end up by using
pistols. Why not start with them? Why should the bandit you are fighting
wait for you to remember your gun? He may shoot you before you do, just as
you are going to slap his face. By using his most deadly weapon at the
beginning of the fight, your enemy saves his strength. Why should he waste
it throwing chairs at you? Moreover, this will enable him to save his own
despicable life. After all, he does not know, either, when you, the noble
hero, will decide to use your gun. Why should he wait for this moment? You
might make a sudden decision to shoot him immediately after throwing custard
pies at him, without waiting for the exchange of chairs. Of course he won't
wait for you when it comes to staying alive. He will shoot first. At the
very start of the fight.
I consoled myself for a long time with the hope that the theory of
escalation in a nuclear war had been dreamed up by the American specialists
to reassure nervous old-age pensioners. Clearly, the theory is too fatally
dangerous to serve as a basis for secret military planning. Yet, suddenly,
the American specialists demonstrated to the whole world that they really
believed that this theory would apply to a world-wide nuclear war. They
really did believe that the bandit they would be fighting would give them
time to throw custard pies and chairs at him before he made use of his most
deadly weapon.
The demonstration was as public as it possibly could be. At the end of
the 1960s the Americans began to deploy their anti-missile defence system.
They could not, of course, use it to defend more than one vitally important
objective. The objective they chose to protect was their strategic rockets.
They did not decide to safeguard the heart and mind of their country--the
President, their government or their capital. Instead they would protect
their pistol--in other words they were showing the whole world that, in the
event of a fight, they did not intend to use it. This revelation was greeted
with the greatest delight in the Kremlin and by the General Staff.
3
The philosophy of the Soviet General Staff is no different from that of
the horsemen whom I had watched riding the desert. `If you want to stay
alive, kill your enemy. The quicker you finish him off, the less chance he
will have to use his own gun.' In essence, this is the whole theoretical
basis on which their plans for a third world war have been drawn up. The
theory is known unofficially in the General Staff as the `axe theory'. It is
stupid, say the Soviet generals, to start a fist-fight if your opponent may
use a knife. It is just as stupid to attack him with a knife if he may use
an axe. The more terrible the weapon which your opponent may use, the more
decisively you must attack him, and the more quickly you must finish him
off. Any delay or hesitation in doing this will just give him a fresh
opportunity to use his axe on you. To put it briefly, you can only prevent
your enemy from using his axe if you use your own first.
The `axe theory' was put forward in all Soviet manuals and handbooks to
be read at regimental level and higher. In each of these one of the main
sections was headed `Evading the blow'. These handbooks advocated, most
insistently, the delivery of a massive pre-emptive attack on the enemy, as
the best method of self-protection. This recommendation was not confined to
secret manuals--non-confidential military publications carried it as well.
But this was trivial by comparison to the demonstration which the
Soviet Union gave the whole world at the beginning of the 1970s, with the
official publication of data about the Soviet anti-missile defence system.
This whole system was, in reality, totally inadequate, but the idea behind
it provides an excellent illustration of the Soviet philosophy on nuclear
war. By contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union had no thought of
protecting its strategic rockets with an anti-missile system. The best
protection for rockets in a war is to use them immediately. Could any one
devise a more effective way of defending them?
4
In addition to such elementary military logic, there are political and
economic reasons which would quite simply compel the Soviet command to make
use of the overwhelming proportion of its nuclear armoury within the first
few minutes of a war.
From the political point of view, the turning point must be reached
within the first few minutes. What alternative could there be? In peacetime
Soviet soldiers desert to the West by the hundred, their sailors jump off
ships in Western ports, their pilots try to break through the West's
anti-aircraft defences in their aircraft. Even in peacetime, the problems
involved in keeping the population in chains are almost insoluble. The
problems are already as acute as this when no more than a few thousand of
the most trusted Soviet citizens have even a theoretical chance of escaping.
In wartime tens of millions of soldiers would have an opportunity to
desert--and they would take it! In order to prevent this, every soldier must
realise quite clearly that, from the very first moments of a war, there is
no sanctuary for him at the other side of the nuclear desert. Otherwise the
whole Communist house of cards will collapse.
From an economic point of view, too, the war must be as short as
possible. Socialism is unable to feed itself from its own resources. The
Soviet variety is no exception to this general rule. Before the revolution,
Russia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia all exported foodstuffs.
Nowadays they have not enough reserves to hold out from one harvest to the
next. Yet shortage of food leads very quickly to manifestations of
discontent, to food-riots and to revolution. Remember what happened in
Novocherkassk in 1962, throughout the Soviet Union in 1964 and in Poland in
1970 and 1980. If socialism is unable to feed itself in peacetime, when the
whole army is used to bring in the harvest, what will happen when the whole
army is thrown into battle and when all the men and vehicles at present used
for agriculture are mobilised for war?
For these reasons, the Communists are forced to plan any adventures
they have in mind for the second part of the year, for the period when the
harvest has already been brought in, and to try to finish them as quickly as
possible. Before the next season for work in the fields comes round.
The Strategic Offensive
1
Soviet generals believe, quite correctly, that the best kind of
defensive operation is an offensive. Accordingly, no practical or
theoretical work on purely defensive operations is carried out at Army level
or higher. In order that they should take the offensive, Soviet generals are
taught how to attack. In order that they should defend themselves
successfully, they are also taught how to attack. Therefore, when we talk of
a large-scale operation--one conducted by a Front or a Strategic
Direction--we can talk only of an offensive.
The philosophy behind the offensive is simple. It is easy to tear up a
pack of cards if you take them one by one. If you put a dozen cards together
it is very difficult to tear them up. If you try to tear up the whole pack
at once you will be unsuccessful: you will not be able to tear them all up,
and, furthermore, not a single card in the pack will be torn. Similarly,
Soviet generals attack only with enormous masses of troops, using their
cards only as a whole pack. In this way, the pack protects the cards which
make it up.
Observing this principle of concentration of resources, in any future
war the Soviet Army will only carry out operations by single Fronts in
certain isolated sectors. In most cases it will carry out strategic
operations--that is to say operations by groups of Fronts working together
in the same sector.
2
The scenario for a strategic offensive operation is a standard one, in
all cases. Let us take the Western Strategic Direction as an example. We
already know that this has a minimum of three Fronts in its first echelon,
one more in its second echelon, and a Group of Tank Armies in its third. The
Baltic Fleet operates on its flank. Each of its Fronts has one Tank Army,
one Air Army and two All-Arms Armies. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief
has at his disposal a Corps from the Strategic Rocket Forces, a Corps from
the Long-Range Air Force, three airborne divisions and the entire forces of
Military Transport Aviation. The rear areas of the Strategic Direction are
protected by three Armies from the National Air Defence Forces. A strategic
offensive is divided into five stages:
The first stage, or initial nuclear strike, lasts for half an hour.
Taking part in this strike are all the rocket formations which can be used
at that stage, including the Corps from the Strategic Rocket Forces, the
rocket brigades of the Fronts and Armies, the rocket battalions of the first
division echelon and all the nuclear artillery which has reached the forward
edge of the battle area. The initial nuclear strike has as its targets:
Command posts and command centres, administrative and political
centres, lines of communication and communications centres--in other words,
the brain and nerve-centres of a state and of its armies.
Rocket bases, stores for nuclear weapons, bases for nuclear submarines
and for bomber aircraft. These targets must be knocked out in order to
reduce Soviet losses at the hands of the enemy to the absolute minimum.
Airfields, anti-aircraft positions, radar stations, to ensure the
success of the offensive breaks in the enemy's defenses, must be made for
Soviet aircraft. The main groupings of the enemy's forces. Why fight them if
they can be destroyed before a battle can begin?
In addition to the forces directly under the command of the C-in-C of
the Strategic Direction, units of the Strategic Rocket Forces will also play
a supporting role in the initial nuclear strike. These will concern
themselves in particular with attacks on the enemy's principal ports, in
order to prevent the enemy from bringing up reinforcements and in order to
isolate the European continent.
Soviet generals consider, with good reason, that an initial nuclear
strike must be unexpected, of short duration and of the greatest possible
intensity. If it is delayed by as much as an hour, the situation of the
Soviet Union will deteriorate sharply. Many of the enemy's fighting units
may move from their permanent locations, his aircraft may be dispersed on to
motorways; divisions of his land forces may leave their barracks, his senior
leaders may move, with their cabinets, to underground shelters or to
air-borne command posts and the task of annihilating them will become
extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is why the maximum possible
number of nuclear weapons will be used to deliver an initial nuclear strike.
The second stage follows immediately upon the first. It lasts between
90 and 120 minutes. It consists of a mass air attack by the Air Armies of
all the Fronts and by all the Long-Range Air Force units at the disposal of
the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction.
This attack is carried out as a series of waves. The first wave
consists of all the available reconnaissance aircraft--not only those of the
reconnaissance regiments but also the squadrons of fighters and fighter
bombers which have been trained in reconnaissance. In all, more than a
thousand reconnaissance aircraft from the Strategic Direction will join this
wave; they will be assisted by several hundred pilotless reconnaissance
aircraft. The primary tasks of the aircraft in this wave are to assess the
effectiveness of the initial nuclear strike and to identify any objectives
which have not been destroyed.
Immediately behind these aircraft comes the main wave, made up of all
the Air Armies and Corps. Nuclear weapons are carried by those aircraft
whose crews have been trained to deliver a nuclear strike. The targets of
this wave are in the same categories as those of the rockets which delivered
the initial nuclear attack. But, unlike the rockets, these aircraft attack
mobile rather than stationary targets. They follow up after the rockets,
finishing off whatever the latter were unable to destroy. Among the first of
their mobile targets are: tank columns which have managed to leave their
barracks, groups of aircraft which have succeeded in taking off from their
permanent airfields and in reaching dispersal points on motorways, and
mobile anti-aircraft weapons.
The Soviet commanders believe that this massive air activity can be
carried out without heavy losses, since the enemy's radars will have been
destroyed, many of his computer systems and lines of communication will have
been disrupted and his aircrews and anti-aircraft forces will have been
demoralised.
While these massive air operations are taking place all staff personnel
will be working at top speed on evaluation of the information which is
coming in about the results of the initial nuclear strike. Meanwhile, all
the rocket launchers which took part in the initial nuclear strike will be
reloading. At the same time, too, the rocket battalions of the divisions and
the rocket brigades of the Armies and Fronts, which did not take part in the
initial strike because they were too far behind the front line, will move up
to the forward edge of the battle area at the maximum possible speed.
All aircraft will then return to their bases and the third stage will
begin immediately.
The third stage, like the first, will last only half an hour. Taking
part in it will be even more rocket launchers than those involved in the
first stage, since many will have moved up from the rear areas. The thinking
behind this plan is simple: in battle the enemy's prime concern will be to
hunt out and destroy all Soviet rocket launchers; each of these should
therefore inflict the maximum possible damage on the enemy before this
happens. The aim is to destroy all those targets which survived the first
and second stages, and to put the maximum possible number of the enemy's
troops and equipment, especially his nuclear weapons, out of action.
The fourth stage lasts between 10 and 20 days. It can be broken down
into offensive operations by individual Fronts. Each Front concentrates all
its efforts on ensuring success for its Tank Army. To achieve this the
All-Arms Army attacks the enemy's defences and the Front Commander directs
the Tank Army to the point at which a breakthrough has been achieved. At the
same time, the entire resources of the Front's artillery division are used
to clear a path for the Tank Army. The rocket brigades lay down a nuclear
carpet ahead of the Tank Army, and the Air Army covers its breakthrough
operation. The Front's anti-tank brigades cover the Tank Army's flanks, the
air-borne assault brigade seizes bridges and crossing points for its use,
and the diversionary brigade, operating ahead of and on the flanks of the
Tank Army, does everything possible to provide it with favourable operating
conditions.
The Tank Army is brought up to a breach in the enemy defences only when
a real breakthrough has been achieved and once the Front's forces have room
for manoeuvre. The Tank Army pushes forward at maximum possible speed to the
greatest depth it can reach. It avoids prolonged engagements, it keeps clear
of pockets of resistance and it often becomes separated by considerable
distances from the other components of the Front. Its task, its aim, is to
deliver a blow like that from a sword or an axe: the deeper it cuts, the
better.
An All-Arms Army advances more slowly than a Tank Army, destroying all
the pockets of resistance in its path and any groups of enemy troops which
have been surrounded, clearing up the area as it moves forward.
A Tank Army is like a rushing flood, tearing its way through a gap in a
dyke, smashing and destroying everything in its path. By contrast an
All-Arms Army is a quiet, stagnant sheet of water, flooding a whole area,
drowning enemy islands and slowly undermining buildings and other structures
until they collapse.
During the first few hours or days of a war, one or all of the Fronts
may suffer enormous losses. But it should not be assumed that the C-in-C of
a Strategic Direction will use his second echelon Front to strengthen or
take the place of the Front which has suffered most. The second echelon
Front is brought into action at the point where the greatest success has
been achieved, where the dyke has really been breached or where at least a
very dangerous crack can be seen developing.
The fifth stage lasts 7-8 days. It may begin at any time during the
fourth stage. As soon as the C-in-C is sure that one of his Fronts has
really broken through, he moves up his second echelon Front and, if this
manages to push through the opening, he brings his striking force, his Group
of Tank Armies, into action. This operation by the Group against the enemy's
rear defences represents the fifth stage of a strategic offensive.
This Group of Tank Armies consists of two Tank Armies. However, by this
time the Tank Armies of the Fronts may already be in action against the
enemy's rear defences. These Tank Armies may be taken away from the Front
Commanders, at the decision of the C-in-C, and incorporated in the Group of
Tank Armies. Towards the end of the action there may be five or even six
Tank Armies in the Group, bringing its establishment up to as much as 10,000
tanks. If during a breakthrough half or even two thirds of these are lost,
the Group still will be of impressive strength.
However, the Soviet General Staff hopes that losses will not be as
large as this. Our pack of cards effect should manifest itself. Moreover,
the operations of the Group of Tank Armies will be supported by all the
resources available to the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction. All his rocket
and air forces will be attacking the enemy with nuclear weapons, his
airborne divisions will be dropped to help the Group to advance. Lastly, the
whole Baltic Fleet will be supporting the Group. If the Group manages to
advance, the whole of the forces available to the State, up to and including
the Supreme Commander himself, can be massed to support it.
3
The strategic offensive has one alternative form. This is sometimes
known as a `Friday evening' offensive. It differs from the normal version
only in dispensing with the first three stages described above. The
operation therefore begins at the fourth stage--with a surprise attack by a
group of Fronts against one or more countries.
In practice, what happened in Czechoslovakia was an operation by a
group of Fronts, carried out swiftly and without warning. Significantly this
operation caught the Czechs off guard--profiting by the Friday evening
relaxation of the State apparatus after a working week. Because of the small
size of Czechoslovakia and the evident disinclination of the Czech army to
defend its country, the C-in-C did not bring his Group of Tank Armies
forward from Byelorussia and the Front commanders did not push their Tank
Armies into Czechoslovakia. Only a very small number of tanks took part in
the operation--some 9,000 in all, drawn from the tank battalions of the
regiments involved, the tank regiments of the divisions and the tank
divisions of the Armies.
The success of the Czech operation produced a new optimism in various
other countries in Europe, which realised that they could hope to be
similarly liberated in the course of a few hours.
The terrible epidemic of pacification which subsequently swept through
Western Europe aroused new hopes of success through a bloodless revolution
in the hearts of the Soviet General Staff.
`Operation Détente'
1
In the winter of 1940, the Red Army broke through the `Mannerheim
Line'. No one knows what price it paid for this victory, but, time and
again, demographers have come up with the same figure--a total of 1,500,000
human lives. Whether this is accurate or not, the losses were so staggering,
even by Soviet standards, that the advance was halted the very moment
Finnish resistance was broken.
The following summer Soviet tanks were rumbling through the streets of
three sovereign states--Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Since then, Soviet
tanks have visited Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Bucharest, Budapest,
Sofia, Belgrade, Pyongyang and even Peking. But they never dared to enter
Helsinki.
Finland is the only country which has fought a war against Soviet
aggression without ever having allowed Soviet tanks to enter its capital.
It is therefore surprising that it is Finland which has become the
symbol of submission to Communist expansion. Halted by the valour with which
this brave country defended itself, the communists changed their tactics. If
they could not bring the Finns to their knees by fighting, they decided they
would do it by peaceful methods. Their new weapon turned out to be more
powerful than tanks. Soviet tanks entered Yugoslavia and Romania but both
countries are independent today. They never reached Helsinki, but Finland
has submitted.
This result surprised even the Soviet Communists themselves and it took
them a long time to appreciate the power of the weapon which had fallen so
unexpectedly into their hands. When they finally realised its effectiveness,
they put it to immediate use against the remaining countries of Western
Europe. Its effects are to be seen everywhere around us. The Communists knew
that they could never seize Western Europe so long as it was capable of
defending itself, and this is why they concentrated their attacks on Western
European determination to stand up to them.
Pacifism is sweeping through the West. It is doing the same in the
Soviet Union. In the West, though, it is uncontrolled while in the USSR it
is encouraged from above. However, both movements have a common aim. Western
pacifists are fighting to stop the installation of new rockets in Western
Europe. Soviet pacifists speak out for the same cause--against the
installation of rockets in Western Europe.
Tactics
1
When I lecture to Western officers on tactics in the Soviet Army, I
often close my talk by putting a question to them--always the same one--in
order to be sure that they have understood me correctly. The question is
trivial and elementary. Three Soviet motor-rifle companies are on the move
in the same sector. The first has come under murderous fire and its attack
has crumbled, the second is advancing slowly, with heavy losses, the third
has suffered an enemy counter-attack and, having lost all its command
personnel, is retreating. The commander of the regiment to which these
companies belong has three tank companies and three artillery batteries in
reserve. Try and guess, I say, how this regimental commander uses his
reserves to support his three companies. `You are to guess,' I say, `what
steps a Soviet regimental commander would take, not a Western one but a
Soviet, a Soviet, a Soviet one.'
I have never yet received the correct reply.
Yet in this situation there is only one possible answer. From the
platoon level to that of the Supreme Commander all would agree that there is
only one possible decision: all three tank companies and all three artillery
batteries must be used to strengthen the company which is moving ahead,
however slowly. The others, which are suffering losses, certainly do not
qualify for help. If the regimental commander, in a state of drunkenness or
from sheer stupidity, were to make any other decision he would, of course,
be immediately relieved of his command, reduced to the ranks and sent to pay
for his mistake with his own blood, in a penal battalion.
My audiences ask, with surprise, how it can be that two company
commanders, whose men are suffering heavy casualties, can ask for help
without receiving any? `That's the way it is,' I reply, calmly. `How can
there be any doubt about it?'
`What happens,' ask the Western officers, `if a Soviet platoon or
company commander asks for artillery support. Does he get it?'
`He has no right to ask for it,' I say.
`And if a company commander asks for air support--does he get it?'
`He has no right to ask for support of any sort, let alone air
support.' My audience smiles--they believe they have found the Achilles heel
of Soviet tactics. But I am always irritated--for this is not weakness, but
strength.
How is it possible not to be irritated? A situation in which every
platoon commander can ask for artillery support is one in which the
divisional commander is unable to concentrate the full strength of his
artillery in the decisive sector--a platoon commander cannot know which this
is. A situation in which every company commander can call for air support is
one in which the Commander of a Group of Armies is unable to bring together
all his aircraft as a single striking force. To a military man this
represents something quite unthinkable--the dispersal of resources.
2
The tactics used by Jenghiz Khan were primitive, in the extreme. His
Mongolian horsemen would never engage in a single combat in any of the
countries which his hordes overran. The training for battle which they
received consisted solely of instruction in maintaining formation and in the
observance of a disciplinary code which was enforced in the most barbarous
way.
During a battle Jenghiz Khan would keep a close watch on the situation
from a nearby hill. As soon as the slightest sign of success was visible at
any point, he would concentrate all his forces there, sometimes even
throwing in his own personal guard. Having broken through the enemy's line
at a single point he would push irresistibly ahead and the enemy army, split
in two, would disintegrate. It is worth recording that he never lost a
battle in his life. Centuries passed and new weapons appeared. It seemed
that this ancient principle of war was dead and buried. That at least was
how it seemed to the French armies at Toulon. But then the young Bonaparte
appeared, mustered all the artillery at the decisive spot and won his first
brilliant victory with lightning speed. Subsequently he always concentrated
his artillery and his cavalry in large numbers. In consequence, his junior
commanders were deprived of both artillery and cavalry. Despite this, for
decades his armies won every battle. At Waterloo he paid the penalty for
abandoning the principle of concentrating his forces in the most important
sector. His defeat there was the price he paid for dispersing his resources.
More time passed, tanks, aircraft and machine-guns made their
appearance. The principles of Jenghiz Khan and Bonaparte were completely
forgotten in France. In 1940 the Allies had more tanks than the Germans.
They were evenly distributed among infantry sub-units, whose commanders were
proud to have tanks directly under their command. Their German opposite
numbers had no such grounds for pride, and this was the reason why Germany's
victory was so rapid and so decisive. The German tanks were not dispersed
but were concentrated in what, by the standards of 1940, were huge groups.
The Allied tanks were scattered, like widely-spread fingers, which could not
be clenched to make a fist. The German tanks struck, as a fist, unexpectedly
and at the weakest point. The Germans' success has gone down in history as a
victory which was won by their tanks.
3
Soviet tactics are of the utmost simplicity; they can be condensed into
a single phrase--the maximum concentration of forces in the decisive sector.
Anyone who was found responsible for dispersing forces of divisional
strength or above during the war was shot without further ado. At lower
levels the usual penalty for wasting resources in this way was reduction to
the ranks and a posting to a penal battalion, which would also lead to
death, though not always immediately, it is true.
Every Soviet operation, from Stalingrad onwards, developed in the way
water breaks through a concrete dam: a single drop seeps through a
microscopic crack, and is followed immediately by a dozen more drops, after
which first hundreds and then thousands of litres pour through at ever
increasing speed, becoming a cataract of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of
raging water.
Here is one entirely typical example of such a breakthrough, carried
out by the 16th Guards Rifle Corps of the 2nd Guards Army at Kursk in 1943.
During an offensive by nine forward battalions only one managed to make any
ground. Immediately, the commander of the regiment to which this battalion
belonged concentrated all his resources at that point, on a front one
kilometre wide. His divisional commander thereupon threw all his forces into
this sector. The breach slowly became deeper and wider and within half an
hour the corps commander's reserves began to arrive. Within three hours, 27
of the 36 battalions belonging to the corps had been brought in to fight in
the narrow sector, which was by now 7 kilometres wide. 1,087 of the 1,176
guns belonging to the corps, and all its tanks, were assembled in the
breakthrough sector. Naturally, the battalion commanders who had been unable
to penetrate the enemy's defences not only received no reinforcements, but
had everything under their command taken away from them. And this was
entirely as it should have been!
As the breach was widened, more and more forces were concentrated
there. As soon as he was informed of the breakthrough the Commander of the
Central Front, General Rokossovskiy, rushed an entire Army to the spot, with
an Air Army to cover the operations. A few days later the Supreme Commander
added his own reserve army, the 4th Tank Army, to the forces breaking
through. Such a massive concentration of forces could not, of course, be
withstood by the German commanders. Several hundred kilometres of their
front disintegrated simultaneously and a hasty withdrawal began. The last
big offensive mounted by the German army in World War II had collapsed.
After this, the Germans never again launched a single large-scale attack,
confining themselves to smaller operations, such as those at Balaton or in
the Ardennes. The moral of this story is clear. If every platoon commander
had had the right to call for fire support for his unit, the corps commander
would have been unable to concentrate his reserves in the breach and the
Front would never have broken through. Without this, there could have been
no success.
4
Modern Soviet tactics, then, follow in the footprints of Jenghiz Khan,
Bonaparte, the German generals who won the battle for France and the Soviet
generals in the war against Germany.
Nuclear weapons have changed the face of war, as did artillery in the
middle ages, the machine gun in the First World War and the tank in the
Second. The principles of military science have not been affected by these
changes, for they are immutable--disperse your forces and you will lose,
concentrate them and you will win.
The only amendment which needs to be made to these ancient principles
in the nuclear age is that a commander must concentrate his nuclear forces,
too, in the main sector, together with the artillery, aircraft, and tanks
which he assembles there. The threat of a nuclear response, too, plays a
role in tactics. The concentration of forces can be completed very rapidly
today, and they are then a target for the enemy's nuclear weapons, whereas
earlier he was unable to use them during the comparatively long time they
took to assemble. Otherwise everything remains as it was. If a single
company breaks through the battalion commander supports it with his whole
mortar battery, leaving the other companies to fend for themselves. Informed
of the success of the company, the commander of the regiment orders his tank
battalions to the sector and arranges for his artillery to provide
concentrated fire support, then the divisional commander moves in his tank
regiment and he too brings in his entire artillery reserves; in addition, he
may arrange to have nuclear strikes carried out ahead of his troops. Then,
flooding through like the torrent, rushing through the broken dam, come all
the tanks and artillery of the Army, all the tanks, aircraft, artillery and
rockets of the Front, of the Strategic Direction, of the Soviet Union and of
its satellites!
5
One further misunderstanding needs clarification. Although a platoon or
company commander is not entitled to summon up aircraft or the divisional
artillery, this certainly does not mean that Soviet forces operate without
fire support. The commander of a Soviet motor-rifle battalion (400 men) has
6 120mm mortars at his disposal. The commander of an American battalion (900
men) has only 4 106mm mortars. The commander of a Soviet regiment (2,100
men) has a battalion of 18 122mm howitzers and a battery of 6 Grad P
multi-barrelled rocket launchers. The commander of an American brigade
(4,000-5,000 men) has no fire weapons at all. Commanders of Soviet and
American divisions have approximately the same quantity of fire weapons.
Commanders of Soviet battalions and regiments, not being entitled to
call on their divisional commanders for help have enough fire weapons under
their command to follow up successes achieved by any of their platoons,
companies or battalions. Since they are equipped with these weapons, the
divisional commander is free to make use of the full weight of his
divisional artillery wherever he decides it is needed.
Rear Supplies
1
Many Western specialists believe that in order to carry out an
operation of the sort described it would be necessary to assemble a massive
concentration of material resources and that the Soviet command would
encounter extreme difficulty in providing its enormous forces with the
supplies they would need. This delusion is based on typical Western concepts
of the organisation of the supply and replenishment of military forces.
The Soviet Army has a completely different approach to the problems of
supply from that adopted in the West--one which avoids many headaches. Let
us start from the fact that a Soviet soldier is not issued with a sleeping
bag, and does not need one. He can be left unfed for several days. All that
he needs is ammunition and this solves many problems. The problem of
supplying Soviet troops in battle is thus confined to the provision of
ammunition. We already know that each commander has transport sub-units at
his disposal; every regiment has a company which can transport loads of 200
tons, every division a battalion with a capacity of 1,000 tons, every Army a
transport regiment, and so forth. All this capacity is used solely to move
up ammunition for advancing forces. Each commander allocates a large
proportion of this ammunition to the sector which is achieving success--the
remainder suffer accordingly.
No less important during a rapid advance is fuel--the life-blood of
war. A basic approach has been taken to the problem of fuel-supply. As a
condition for its acceptance by the armed Services, every type of Soviet
combat vehicle--tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery prime movers,
etc.--must have sufficient fuel capacity to take it at least 600 kilometres.
Thus, Soviet Fronts would be able to make a dash across Western Germany
without refuelling. Thereafter, the pipe-laying battalion of each Army would
lay a line to the Front's main pipeline which would have been laid by the
Front's pipe-laying regiment. The Front's pipelines would be linked with
secret underground main lines which had been laid down in Eastern Europe in
peacetime. In addition, the C-in-C of a Strategic Direction has under his
command a pipe-laying brigade, which can be used to assist the Fronts. At
the terminals of the pipelines the pipe-layers set up a number of refuelling
centres, each of which can simultaneously refuel a battalion or even a
regiment. In addition, the Soviet Army is at present evolving techniques for
using helicopters for fuel resupply. Let us take a division which is
advancing. One of its tank battalions has stopped, on orders from the
divisional commander, and is left behind by the other battalions. In a field
by the road, on which the battalion has halted, a V-12 helicopter lands,
carrying 40 or more tons of fuel. Within ten minutes it has refuelled all
the tanks and taken off again. The battalion sets off for the front again,
replacing another which halts to refuel. A single V-12 helicopter flying at
low altitude at a speed of 250 kilometres an hour, can refuel a whole
division in one day. It is not particularly vulnerable, since it is flying
over its own rear areas, which are protected by the Air Defence Troops of
the Land Forces. If trucks were used to supply a division hundreds of them
would be needed, travelling on damaged, overloaded roads and presenting an
excellent target. The destruction of a single bridge could bring them all to
a halt. While a single truck carrying ten tons would take twenty-four hours
to make a particular journey, a helicopter could do the same job in one
hour. Even if helicopters were more vulnerable than endless convoys of
trucks, Soviet generals would still use them, for time is far more precious
than money during a war.
Provisions, spare parts, etc. are, quite simply, not supplied.
2
Now let us see how this works in practice. A division which is up to
full strength, fully equipped, fed and fuelled, with more than 2,000 tons of
ammunition, is moving up into action from the second echelon. This division
can spend from three to five days in action, without rest for either its
soldiers or its officers. The wounded are evacuated to the rear by the
medical battalion, after first aid has been given.
Its companies, battalions and regiments waste no time waiting for spare
parts for equipment which has been damaged. They simply throw it aside. The
repair and refitting battalion mends whatever it can, cannibalising one tank
to repair two or three others, removing its engine, tracks, turret and
anything else which is needed. Any piece of equipment which is seriously
damaged is left for removal to the rear by the Army's or the Front's mobile
tank repair workshop.
In action, the division fights with great determination, but its
numbers dwindle. Some of its fighting equipment is returned after repair,
but not a great deal. After three to five days of hard fighting, the
survivors are sent back to the second echelon, their place being taken by a
fresh division which has been well fed and fully rested. From the remnants
of the old division, a new one is quickly put together. Combat equipment is
provided by the tank repair workshops. The fact that it belonged to some
other division only the day before is immaterial. Reinforcements reach the
new division from the hospitals--whether these soldiers and officers
formerly belonged to other divisions, Armies or Fronts is also immaterial.
With them arrive equipment from the factories and reservists--some of whom
are older, others still very young boys. The division shakes down, exercises
and allows its soldiers to get all the sleep they need. Then, after five
days, it moves up into action, fully fed and fuelled, with 2,000 tons of
ammunition.
Often, while it is reforming, a division receives entirely new
equipment, straight from the factory, but it may also be issued with older
material taken from store, while its own, or what remains of it, is taken
from it for some other division which is also re-forming, not far away.
Frequently, after a particularly punishing series of battles, a
division cannot be re-formed. In this event all its commanders from company
level upwards are withdrawn and what is left of the division is administered
by the deputies to the battalion and regimental commanders and by the deputy
divisional commander. This remnant will continue to fight, to the last man,
while the divisional commander and his subordinates are in the rear,
receiving new equipment and new soldiers. Within a short period of time they
return to the battle in which what was left of their former division
perished so recently.
One most important element needed for the rebuilding of a new division
is its old colours. A fresh division can be set up very quickly around the
old colours. But if the colours are lost--that is the end of the division.
If such a thing should happen, all its former commanders are sent to penal
battalions, where they expiate their guilt with blood, while their division
is disbanded and used to bring others up to strength.
Here is an example from the history of the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk Iron
Division, with which I entered Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The division was established in 1918 and was one of the best in the Red
Army. Lenin corresponded personally with some of its soldiers. It was active
in the war against Germany from the very beginning of hostilities and
distinguished itself in the fighting near Minsk until, as part of the 13th
Army, it found itself encircled. Part of the division managed to break out
but its colours were lost. Despite its past achievements, the division was
disbanded and its various officers were tried by military tribunals. In
1944, when the Red Army once again reached and then crossed the Soviet
frontiers, a special commission began questioning local inhabitants in an
attempt to discover where Soviet officers and soldiers who had been killed
in action during the first days of the war were buried. A peasant, D. N.
Tyapin, told the commission how he had found the body of a Soviet officer,
wrapped in a flag, and how he had buried the body, with the flag. The grave
was immediately opened and the colours of the 24th Iron Division were found.
The flag was immediately sent away for restoration and, just as quickly, a
new division was formed and given the old colours, the battle honours and
the title of the old division. Today the 24th Iron Division is one of the
most famous in the Soviet Army. However, despite the fact that it
distinguished itself in the battle which ended the war, it was never made a
Guards division. It was not forgiven for the loss of its colours.
Part Six
Equipment
What Sort of Weapons?
1
I adore weapons. Of every sort. I love military equipment and military
uniforms. One day I shall open a small museum, and the first exhibit which I
shall buy for my museum will be an American jeep. This is a real miracle
weapon. It was designed before the Second World War and it served from the
first day to the last, like a faithful soldier. It was dropped by parachute,
it was soaked in salt water, it smashed its wheels on the stony deserts of
Libya and sank into swamps on tropical islands. It served honourably in the
mountains of Norway and of the Caucasus, in the Alps and the Ardennes. And,
since the war, can any other military vehicle have seen so many
battles--Korea, Vietnam, Sinai, Africa, the Arctic, South America,
Indonesia, India, Pakistan? And is there any sort of weapon which has not
been installed on a jeep? Recoilless guns, anti-tank rockets, machine guns.
And it has worked on reconnaissance duties, as an ambulance, a patrol
vehicle, a commander and an ordinary military workhorse.
And how many types of tanks, guns, aircraft, rockets have come and gone
in the time of the jeep? They were important and impressive, the jeep was
grey and undistinguished. But they have gone and the jeep is still there.
And how many times have they tried to replace the jeep? But it is
indispensable. In the desert, more reliable than a camel, in the grasslands
faster than a leopard, in the Arctic hardier than a Polar bear.
Another exhibit in my museum will be a Kalashnikov automatic assault
rifle. Not one of those the terrorists used to kill the Olympic athletes or
the one I had with me in Czechoslovakia or one of those the Communists
killed doctors with in Cambodia. No, it will be one of the thousands
captured by the American marines in Vietnam and used in their desperate
attempt to halt Communism and to avert the calamity which threatened the
Vietnamese people.
American soldiers in Vietnam often mistrusted their own weapons and
preferred to use their Kalashnikov trophies. This was not so simple, for
they could hardly expect to be supplied with the proper rounds for these
weapons but...
